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CREATED FACTS AND THE FLAWED ONTOLOGY
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Justin Hughes*
It is black letter doctrine that facts are not copyrightable: facts are discov-
ered, not created-so they will always lack the originality needed for copyright
protection. As straightforward as this reasoning seems, it is fundamentally
flawed. Using the "social facts" theory of philosopher John Searle, this Article
explores a variety of "created facts" cases-designation systems, systematic eval-
uations, and privately written laws-in which original expression from private
individuals is adopted by social convention and generates facts in our social
reality. In the course of this discussion, the paper places facts in their historical
and philosophical context, explores how courts conflate facts with expressions of
fact, and explains the difference between social facts created by expression and
the 'facts" of literature and fiction.
Having established that the copyrighted works discussed in these cases pro-
duce facts, the question arises whether copyright's merger doctrine eliminates the
copyright protection-a result that is both seemingly harsh and seemingly neces-
sary. This Article proposes a recalibration of the merger doctrine to acknowl-
edge that "created facts" are a unique situation in which the incentive of
copyright is needed not just to generate the expression, but also needed to gener-
ate the facts.
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INTRODUCTION
The writ of copyright reaches all original expression, a phrase that
contains the two principal boundaries of copyright's realm. On one
side, copyright law protects only expression, never ideas-no matter
how imaginative those ideas are. On the other side, faithfully retype
nineteenth-century poems to your heart's content, but you will not get
a copyright-because the expression you have produced is not
original.
It is equally black letter law that facts are outside the realm of
copyright because they similarly fail the originality requirement. As
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the Supreme Court told us in the 1991 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Telephone Service Co.' case, "facts do not owe their origin to an act of
authorship"2 and, therefore, they will always fail the minimal creativity
requirement of copyright law. The unanimous Feist opinion says little
as to the nature of facts, but it is clear that the Justices view a "fact" as
something we discover, as something that might happen to us, not
something that originates with us.3 A person might experience a fact;
she does not create it.
The problem with the Feist analysis is that it is wrong-and that
error has produced over a decade of distortion in copyright doctrine.
Feist is wrong because many facts clearly owe their origin to discrete
acts of human originality. These human-created facts function in the
social discourse no differently than the temperature in downtown Chi-
cago on a particular date or the frequency with which "Old Faithful"
erupts in Yellowstone Park. Indeed, the facts most unimpeachably dis-
covered-ice core depths in Antarctica, planets orbiting distant starts,
new species of animals-are often less important to your daily life
than many facts that are human-created-such as the credit rating
that Equifax gives you or the valuation your insurer gives your car
after an accident.
This Article explores the strange world of "created facts," a world
in which the expressive work brings the very facts themselves into exis-
tence. There are two incompatible characteristics of these situations:
First, if the copyright incentive is needed to produce the expression,
copyright is also needed for the facts to exist. Second, if the expres-
sion really produces facts, then one of copyright's core principles-
the "merger" doctrine-is likely to denude the expression of any pro-
tection. To avoid this second outcome, the discussion below proposes
that we modestly amend how the merger doctrine works.
As an initial matter, Part I places facts in their historical and epis-
temological context, showing how copyright law-and the legal system
generally-adheres to a view of facts that is out of sync with much
philosophy and social theory. But accepting "facts" as an inevitable
construct of the legal system, Part II then explores how facts can arise
in social life, following the work of philosopher John Searle. Parts III,
IV, and V turn to the case law that has been percolating around three
kinds of facts created by original expression: when private individuals
create expression which becomes law; when people create evaluations,
judgments, or opinions that become widely accepted as true; and sim-
1 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
2 Id. at 347.
3 Id.
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ply when people name things. We will see that until quite recently,
courts have been unwilling to recognize that these original expres-
sions produce "facts" because, per Feist, such recognition would
largely destroy any copyright protection.
Different commentators have analyzed some of these cases in dif-
ferent ways. Lawrence Cunningham has discussed some of these cases
as the integration of private expression into public laur4 Dennis Karjala
has approached some of these cases recognizing the establishment of
copyright over taxonomic systems;5 Pamela Samuelson has critiqued
some of these cases as establishing copyright over standards;6 and I
have separately criticized some of these cases for creating indepen-
dent copyright protection over "microworks. '' 7 But the emphasis here
is on the fact-creating characteristic of these expressive works. To that
end, Part VI explores further how expressive works can produce
"facts" as real-much more real for most of us-as the temperatures
on the Martian surface or what we know happened from the fossil
record.
Having established that the copyrighted works discussed in these
cases produce facts, the question arises whether copyright's merger
doctrine eliminates the copyright protection-a result that is both
seemingly harsh and seemingly necessary. Part VII considers fair use,
implied licenses, and merger doctrines as limiting principles for copy-
right protection in such works. I propose a recalibration of the
merger doctrine borrowing from antitrust's "essential facilities" doc-
trine to produce a result that makes the created facts accessible with-
out eliminating the copyright incentive that leads to the facts' very
creation.
I. FEisT, FACTS, AND ExPREssIONS OF FACTS
The 1991 Feist case is now synonymous with the proposition that
facts are outside the gamut of copyright protection. The defendant,
Feist Publications, had sought to create a regional telephone directory
for northwest Kansas. 8 To that end, Feist had copied entries from
Rural Telephone's white pages telephone directory without authoriza-
4 Lawrence A. Cunningham, Private Standards in Public Law: Copyright, Lawmaking
and the Case of Accounting, 104 MICH L. REV. 291, 296-307 (2005).
5 Dennis S. Karjala, Distinguishing Patent and Copyright Subject Matter, 35 CONN. L.
REV. 439, 495-500 (2003).
6 Pamela Samuelson, Questioning Copyright in Standards, 48 B.C. L. REV. 193,
196-203 (2007).
7 Justin Hughes, Size Matters (or Should) in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV.
575, 576-82, 591-616 (2005).
8 Feist, 499 U.S. at 340.
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tion-over 1300 entries verbatim and an additional 3600 entries in
part.9 Rural Telephone sued for copyright infringement. " ,
Interestingly, the word "fact" does not appear in the Court's
description of the disputants' activities. The Court characterizes
Rural as refusing "to license its listings," tells us that Feist "verified the
data reported by Rural," and even describes its own action as
"grant[ing] certiorari . . . to determine whether the copyright in
Rural's directory protects the names, towns, and telephone numbers
copied by Feist."" It is only when Justice O'Connor turns to doc-
trine-and the very moment she turns to doctrine-that we are told
that the case involves the interaction of two fundamental propositions
of copyright law: "The first is that facts are not copyrightable; the
other, that compilations of facts generally are."12
But what are these facts? Perhaps the only important thing the
Court tells us about the nature of facts is that they are discovered, not
created:
Facts do not owe their origin to an act of authorship. The distinc-
tion is one between creation and discovery: The first person to find
and report a particular fact has not created the fact; he or she has
merely discovered its existence. To borrow from Burrow-Giles, one
who discovers a fact is not its "maker" or "originator."' 3
Exemplary of how facts are discovered, the Feist Court described how
"[c]ensus takers . . . do not 'create' the population figures that
emerge from their efforts" because these facts are "figures from the
world around them. ' 14 It follows that the one unifying characteristic
of "all facts-scientific, historical, biographical, and news of the day" is
that they "are not 'original' in the constitutional sense. 1 5 In other
words, if facts are always discovered, then they always lack originality;
if they always lack originality, then they are always beyond the ambit of
copyright. This unanimous decision, 16 cast at the constitutional level
9 Id. at 343.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 343-44.
12 Id. at 345.
13 Id. at 347 (citing Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58
(1884)).
14 Id. Because "[flacts are never original," id. at 358, the Feist Court concluded
that "[t]he only conceivable expression is the manner in which the compiler has
selected and arranged the facts," id. at 349.
15 Id. at 347-48.
16 See, e.g., Marci A. Hamilton, Copyright at the Supreme Court: A Jurisprudence of
Deference, 47J. COPYIGHT Soc'v U.S.A. 317, 321 (2000) (discussing the rarity of unani-
mous decisions in copyright).
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when it could have been easily decided at the statutory level, 17 had a
powerful impact on copyright law, both here and abroad.
Philosophically, the Feistian view of facts as "out there," waiting to
be discovered (and capable of being discovered) is realism, a realism
that is basic to our entire legal system.' 8 The view of facts laid out in
Feist could be drawn right from criminal law, negligence doctrine,jury
instructions, and the deference appellate courts have for triers of
fact. 19 Our legal system requires a notion of facts as having what Wil-
lard Van Orman Quine described as "unvarnished objectivity . . . a
certain accessibility to observation . . .and the hint of bruteness."
20
This is precisely what Los Angeles police Sgt. Joe Friday meant on
Dragnet whenever he implored female witnesses to provide 'just the
facts, ma'am.''2 1 In just this spirit, the Feist Court understood "wholly
factual information" to be "raw data."22
17 The Court could have achieved the same result at the statutory level, and much
of Justice O'Connor's opinion is devoted to the conclusion that purely factual works
are not "original works" under the statute. Feist, 499 U.S. at 354-59. Some scholars
identify 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)'s prohibition on copyright in "discoveries" as the prohibi-
tion on copyright in facts. See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NiMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 2.11[A], at 2-178.9 (2007) ("The current Act has codified the rule pre-
cluding copyright in facts by providing that its protection does not extend to any
'discovery."'). But § 102(b)'s preclusion of any "discovery" from copyright protection
may refer to patentable inventions, not facts. Justice O'Connor does not pin her stat-
utory interpretation on the word "discovery," but rather says only that "[s]ection
102(b) is universally understood to prohibit any copyright in facts." Feist, 499 U.S. at
356.
18 Simon Blackburn describes realism as holding the view that statements
describe the world; they answer to or represent (independent) facts of a
particular kind .... These facts are discovered, not created, and they have
their own 'ontological' and 'metaphysical' natures, about which reflection
can inform us.
The facts or aspects of the world that make commitments true or false
[are] 'mind independent,' or not of our own making.
SIMON BLAcKBuRN, TRUTH 117-18 (2005).
19 Cf., e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Rethinking Patent Law in the Administrative State, 42 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 127, 145 (2000) ("Questions of fact describe the state of affairs in the
world, such as the time of day when an event occurred or the temperature at a partic-
ular time in a particular place.").
20 WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, WORD AND OBJECT 247 (1960). In this common
understanding of facts, "facts ... make sentences true." Id. Simon Blackburn charac-
terizes this as the "absolutist" view of truth-which seems a good characterization of
that for which law aims. BLAcKnuRN, supra note 18 at xv. Of it, he says, "We like plain,
unvarnished objective fact, and we like it open, transparent, and unfiltered." Id.
21 Dragnet (NBC television broadcast 1951-59, 1967-70).
22 Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
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A. A Very Short History of Facts
Our judicial system's foundation on factfinding is a reflection of
the long development of the fact in science, commerce, and public
policy. Scholars have studied how late seventeenth- and then eight-
eenth-century thinkers sought to emphasize the need for observa-
tional particulars, for separating theory from the collection of
observational data, and for privileging these "facts" until they became,
in Mary Poovey's apt description, "the epistemological unit that
organizes most of the knowledge projects of the past four centuries. 23
At the beginning of this historical path, the fact or "factum" simply
meant an "event or occurrence," particularly one whose truth had
been established by observation. 24
This observable fact that is "out there" became foundational for
empiricism, for the kind of public policy debates that took hold in the
West in the eighteenth century, and, arguably, for democratic self-gov-
ernance itself. This is because cleaving observed particulars from
(apparently more) theoretical arguments allowed learned men to
agree on something, while they disagreed strenuously on issues of the-
ory, method, ideology, or policy. 2 5 As one philosopher turned reason-
ing entrepreneur commented recently at a conference on the
presentation of evidence, "[e]very argument bottoms out with some-
23 MARY PoovEY, THE HISTORY OF THE MODERN FACT xiii (1998); see also PETER
DEAR, DISCIPLINE AND EXPERIENCE 1 (1995) ("The cultural and intellectual prerequi-
sites for the nineteenth-century explosion of organized science were the operational
ideal, which made the world into something to be mastered, and a quantitative episte-
mology, which held that such an ideal exhausted everything accessible to human
knowing."); Lorraine Daston, Baconian Facts, Academic Civility, and the Prehistoly of
Objectivity, 8 ANNALS OF SCHOLARSHIP 337, 338 (1991) [hereinafter, Daston, Baconian
Facts] ("Facts came to be detached from the context of theory and observation
because of anomalies of all sorts preoccupied late Renaissance natural philoso-
phers."); Lorraine Daston, Objectivity and the Escape from Perspective, 22 Soc. STUD. SCI.
597, 600 (1992) ("[A] perspectival objectivity first made its appearance ... in the
moral and aesthetic philosophy of the latter half of the eighteenth century."). Poovey
refers to this scholarship as "historical epistemology," supra, at 7.
24 Mary Poovey argues that in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries,
there were different "epistemological units called 'a fact"' and that "natural histori-
ans.., did collect deracinated particulars... for whom factum retained its old conno-
tations of 'event or occurrence,' 'a particular truth known by actual observation .... "
PoovEY, supra note 23, at 9 (quoting 5 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 651 (2d ed.
1989)).
25 Id. at 111 (noting that seventeenth and eighteenth century English writers and
scholars argued that facts were separable "from both theory and method in order to
decrease the likelihood of civil dispute"); see also HANNAH ARENDT, BETWEEN PAST AND
FUTURE 259-60 (1968) (describing how the "fact-finder"-witness or reporter-needs
to be outside the community debating issues and differing in opinions).
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thing that is not argumentative ... with a nonargumentative move." 26
Those nonargumentative moves are typically appeals to agreed-upon
facts.
In the view of Poovey and historian Lorraine Daston, this use of
observed particulars as the support structure for theories and general-
izations became the distinguishing epistemic characteristic of science
and public policy from the eighteenth century onward. For Daston,
the rise of empiricism created a situation in which the fact-as a
"deracinated particular"-was elevated to the status of "the indubita-
ble core of knowledge, more 'certain and immutable' than axioms
and syllogistic demonstrations." 27 The Feist Court's mention of census
data28 echoes how very much American culture, from its inception,
embraced the notion of facts as gathered observations of the disinter-
ested. For example, by the time Thomas Malthus was preparing the
second edition of his Essay on the Principle of Population in 1803, a very
large chunk of his statistical source materials came from the United
States. 29 Embodying the thinking of his time, Max Weber considered
a "sharp fact/value dichotomy as something inseparable from modern
scientific sophistication."30  In the early twentieth century, Walter
26 Tim van Gelder, Remarks at the Graphic and Visual Representations of Evi-
dence and Inference in Legal Settings Conference, Cardozo School of Law (Jan. 28,
2007).
27 Daston, Baconian Facts, supra note 23, at 345. The struggle between pure theo-
rists and the new, empirically-based science epitomized by Bacon and the Royal Soci-
ety, was a powerful intellectual theme of the seventeenth century. See generally
MARGARET GULLAN-WHUR, WITHIN REASON 115-18 (2000) (detailing controversies
among Bacon, the Royal Society, mechanical philosophers, Henry Oldenburg, and
Spinoza on scientific work and debate).
28 Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991).
29 The first edition of the book appeared in 1798 and was substantially revised
with extensive empirical information for later editions. See THOMAS ROBERT
MALTHUS, Essay on Population: Godwin on Malthus (1821), reprinted in 4 THE WORKS OF
THOMAS ROBERT MALTHUS, at 165-69 (E.A. Wrigley & David Souden eds., William
Pickering 1986). The American statistical material in the later edition included Adam
Seybert's Statistical Annals of the United States, John Bristed's America and Her Resources,
and the American National Calendar. PoovEy, supra note 23, at 290. The Seybert
material was the U.S. Census. ADAM SEYBERT, STATISTICAL ANNALS 15-53 (Philadel-
phia, Thomas Dobson & Son 1818). Seybert, a Pennsylvania Congressman, looked at
the 120 official volumes of census data published by Congress and concluded that the
data was "too much diffused to be made the subjects of immediate reference."
SEYBERT, supra, at vi. In a civic-minded, albeit private, capacity, Seybert then pub-
lished Statistical Annals. In comparison to America's focus on statistically understand-
ing its New World, the British did not conduct their first national census until 1801.
PoovEY, supra note 23, at 291.
30 Hilary Putnam, Are Moral and Legal Values Made or Discovered, in 1 LEGAL THE-
ORv 5, 12 (1995); see also, e.g., Max Weber, Science as a Vocation, in THE VOCATION
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Lippmann noted how news-the facts of the day--" 'comes from a dis-
tance' 31 and from beyond one's own "'self-contained community,"' 3 2
thereby providing a basis for public debate. Indeed, one of the most
fundamental critiques of the George W. Bush administration has been
its "assault on reason" in which the Bush "team seemed to approach
every question of fact as a partisan fight to the finish. '33
The fact as the foundation of modern empiricism was closely
aligned with David Hume's "pictorial semantics" view of facts-facts
are things people can see and of which they can form clear, mental
pictures.3 4 This Humean view was the ancestor of twentieth-century
logical positivism 3 5 and scientific realism.3 6 Broadly understood, most
of us adhere most of the time to this "extra-lingual" or "mind-indepen-
dent" view of facts, at least to the degree that there is something out
there to which an expression of fact corresponds. In this "correspon-
dence theory," true statements are statements which correspond to
LECTURES 1, 21 (David Owen & Tracy B. Strong eds., Rodney Livingstone trans., 2004)
("I am willing to demonstrate from the writings of our historians that whenever an
academic introduces his own value judgment, a complete understanding of the facts
comes to an end.").
31 Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion,
Democratic Deliberations and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 603, 635
(1990) (quoting WALTER LIPPMANN, LIBERTY AND THE NEwS 38 (1920); WALTER LIPP-
MANN, PUBLIC OPINIONS 263-75 (1922)).
32 Id.
33 AL GORE, THE ASSAULT ON REASON 56 (2007). Former Vice President Gore
argues that "[t]he Bush administration has demonstrated contempt for the basic ten-
ets of a rational decision-making process, defined as one in which an honest emphasis
is placed on getting good facts and then letting good facts drive decisions." Id. at 62.
34 See, e.g., HILARY PUTNAM, THE COLLAPSE OF THE FACT/VALUE DICHOTOMY AND
OTHER ESSAYS 15 (2002).
35 For Rudolph Carnap a "fact" could be established by observation of the physi-
cal world only. RUDOLF CARNAP, THE LOGICAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE WORLD (Rolf A.
George trans., 2d ed. 1967); see also Rudolf Carnap, Testability and Meaning, in THEO-
RIES AND OBSERVATION IN SCIENCE 27, 43 (Richard E. Grandy ed., 1973) ("As empiri-
cists ... we require that descriptive predicates and hence synthetic sentences are not
to be admitted unless they have some connection with possible observations ....").
This position had to be modified quickly to account for atomic theory and modern
(pre-quantum) physics. See CARNAP, THE LOGICAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE WORLD,
supra, at viii-ix.
36 For example, Michael Devitt defines "scientific realism" as holding that
"[m]ost of the essential unobservables of well-established current scientific theories
exist mind-independently and mostly have the properties attributed to them by sci-
ence." Michael Devitt, Scientific Realism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPO-
RARY PHILOSOPHY 767, 769 (Frank Jackson & Michael Smith eds., 2005).
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real world facts; facts are states of the world.3 7 "Santa Claus lives at the
North Pole" is not a true statement because it does not correspond to
any fact (state of the world), but "Santa Claus is commonly depicted as
living at the North Pole" is a true statement of fact because it corre-
sponds to the contents of innumerable films, books, and holiday
displays.
B. A World(view) Without Facts
This neat worldview was always subject to doubt and caveat, but
came under increasing attack in the twentieth century. While a law
review article is not the place to review these schools of thought, a
general sense of the intellectual topography helps place copyright's
ontology in context.
A main line of critique has been against the fact/value distinction
itself, i.e., to question whether there are any facts (or truths) indepen-
dent of our theories. As Hilary Putnam puts it, "Perception is not
innocent; it is an exercise of our concepts,"38 or as Jose Ortega y Gas-
set wrote, "Reality is not a datum, not something given or bestowed,
but a construction which man makes out of the given material. 39
Rooted at least as far back as Francis Bacon, 40 this rich, arguably domi-
nant, body of twentieth-century philosophy and social science con-
cluded, in one way or another, that facts are not pebbles waiting to be
picked up; the size and shape of the pieces of reality we see are just
the result of how we hammer and chisel the world.41 As Thomas
37 See, e.g., ROBERT NozICK, THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY 107-14 (1993);JoHN R.
SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SociAL REALITY 199-226 (1995); see also BLAcKBuRN,
supra note 18, at 56 ("This is the idea that truth can be understood and explained in
terms of correspondence with the facts. It is not merely the idea that 'true' means
'corresponds with the facts'; this may be a harmless synonym.... But for the phrase
to work as a philosophical explanation of truth, more is needed. It is needed that
'corresponds' means something on its own, and 'facts' are identifiable in some special
way, and then we can put them together and see correspondence with the facts as a
special kinds of success."); EJ. Lowe, Fact, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY
287 (Ted Honderich ed., 2d ed. 2005) ("A fact is, traditionally, the worldly correlate
of a true proposition, a state of affairs whose obtaining makes that proposition true.").
38 PUTNAM, supra note 34, at 102.
39 JOSE ORTEGA V GASSET, MAN AND CRIsis 13 (Mildred Adams trans., 1958).
40 FRANCIS BACON, THE NEW ORGANON, bk. I, aphorism XLI, at 41 (LisaJardine &
Michael Silverthorne eds., 2000) ("The human understanding is like an uneven mir-
ror receiving rays from things and merging its own nature with the nature of things,
which thus distorts and corrupts it.").
41 Just a small sample of thinkers along these lines include WILLIAM JAMES, The
Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy, in WRITINGS 445, 466 (Gerald E.
Myers ed., Library of America 1992) (1987) ("Objective evidence and certitude are
doubtless very fine ideals to play with, but where on this moonlit and dream-visited
[VOL. 83:1
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Kuhn noted, a "fact" which does not fit the current scientific theory
does not count as a fact at all: it is a mistake or an anomaly until our
theory is adjusted to deal with it.42
Of course, all this sits quite uncomfortably with the law's reliance
on "facts" and, yet again, Feist provides a simple example whose com-
plexity was overlooked by the Court. When census workers gather
information on literacy, occupations, and incomes of respondents,
these are facts created by humans in the regular course of living-and
"discovered" subsequently by other humans. But when the census
enumerators start compiling facts about race, things become murkier.
The abiding debates about census racial categories show that racial
facts are very much constructed by our judgments about categories. 43
planet are they found?"); I RICHARD RORTY, OBJECTIVITY, RELATVSM, AND TRUTH 141
(1991) ("If the truth itself is to be an explanation of something, that explanadum
must be of something which can be caused by truth, but not caused by the content of
true beliefs."); RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 364 (1979)
(noting that the distinction between facts and values is "disastrous" because it "forces
us to pretend that we can split ourselves up into knowers of true sentences on the one
hand and choosers of lives or actions or works of art on the other") [hereinafter
RORTY, PHILOSOPHY]; R.W. SLEEPER, THE NECESSITY OF PRAGMATISM 141 (1986) (argu-
ing that John Dewey followed William James to seek "to demonstrate that there is no
conceptually valid basis for the disjunction between factual judgment and value judg-
ment"). Other attacks on the fact/value distinction have come from MARTIN HEIDEG-
GER, BEING AND TIME 133 (Joan Stambaugh trans., State University of New York Press
1996) (1953) and JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHINGNESS 71-78, 147-55 (Hazel
E. Barnes trans., 1956). Wittgenstein's own views were so subtle or ambiguous that he
can sometimes be claimed by realists and sometimes by truth relativists. See BLACK-
BURN, supra note 18, at xix, 129-33.
42 THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 53 (3d ed. 1996)
("Assimilating a new sort of fact demands a more than additive adjustment of theory,
and until that adjustment is completed-until the scientist has learned to see nature
in a different way-the new fact is not quite a scientific fact at all."). To be fair, Kuhn
is giving an example where the observation of X occurs and we have to make adjust-
ments to conclude Xis a fact, KUHN, supra, at 53-58, while Rorty, Putnam, and others
describe the observation occurring or not occurring because of the perceptual tools
with which we have equipped ourselves, RORTY, PHILOSOPHY, supra, note 41, at
306-11; Putnam, supra note 30, at 12-16.
43 Over the history of the census, it has offered at least twenty-six different racial
or ethnic characterizations for respondents. In recent times, the process left many
people feeling that they were pigeonholed, i.e., that their racial status (the actual
reality about their race) was not accurately captured. See Agustin Gurza, In Search of a
Census Pigeonhole, L.A. TIMES, July 6, 1999, at B10; Orlando Patterson, America's Worst
Idea, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REv., Oct. 22, 2000, at 15 (reviewing SCOTr MALCOMSON, ONE
DROP OF BLOOD (2000) and noting that "the nation's Census Bureau has had such a
thoroughly bizarre history of racial categorization that recently, out of sheer concep-
tual and political exhaustion, it gave up and asked people to classify themselves in any
and as many racial ways as the spirit moved them"); see also Steven A. Holmes, The
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Similarly, when the 1920 Census reported that 51.2% of the American
population was living in urban areas, 44 it sounds like a pretty hard-
boiled fact until you learn that the Census Bureau decided that any-
one in a town with over 2500 inhabitants was a "city" dweller 4 5-an
evaluation quite different from what we might make today.
C. Another World(view) Without Facts
In a more radical contrast to the traditional correspondence the-
ory, a number of twentieth-century philosophers have reasoned that
facts are only linguistic elements or propositional elements46 and that
our notion of a "fact" should be reduced to that of a true statement
(and effectively eliminated). As Quine succinctly observed, "In ordi-
nary usage 'fact' often occurs where we could without. loss say 'true
sentence' or. . . 'true proposition.' ,,47 The reduction of "facts" to true
statements led many philosophers to conclude that the nature of facts
is an ancillary issue-if an issue at all-for inquiries into the nature of
truth and knowledge. 48 As Colin McGinn writes of his own epistemo-
Confusion over Who We Are, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2001, § 4, at 1 (describing issues sur-
rounding racial categories on census).
44 Helen B. Shaffer, Population Profile of the United States, in EDITORIAL RESEARCH
REPORTS ON THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT 1, 12 (Richard M. Boeckel & William B. Dickin-
son eds., Congressional Quarterly, Inc. 1969) ("The 1920 census was first to tip the
balance with 51.2 per cent counted as city dwellers.").
45 MARGOJ. ANDERSON, THE AMERICAN CENSUS 134 (1988).
46 For example, in the 1950s, P.F. Strawson advanced the view that "facts" were
linguistic elements. Strawson thought that in order to specify a fact-in order to
answer the question "which fact?"-one would have to have a true statement already.
P.F. Strawson, Truth, 34 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN Soc'Y 129, 134 (1950). Strawson
believed that facts were linguistic in that "[flacts are what statements (when true)
state; they are not what statements are about." Id. at 136.
47 QUINE, supra note 20, at 247. Of course, for many philosophers a "true sen-
tence" and a "true proposition" differ in that propositions are nonlinguistic entities
expressed by sentences. See, e.g., Michael Dummett, Truth, in PHILOSOPHICAL Locic
49, 50 (P.F. Strawson ed., 1967). In that view, "it rains" and "ilpleut" express the same
proposition. Frege held to a view of this sort, defining a fact as "a thought [gedanke]
that is true." Gottlob Frege, The Thought: A Logical Inquiry, in PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC,
supra, at 17, 35. Here gedanke seems to mean proposition, not a mental state-a point
that Frege clarifies later on the page. Id. My thanks to David Dolinko for this
clarification.
48 See, e.g., LAURENCE BoNjouR, THE STRUCTURE OF EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE 87-89
(1985) (dealing very little with "facts" in its analysis of knowledge); QUINE, supra note
20, passim; see also WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, QUIDDITIES 3-5, 213 (1987) [hereinaf-
ter QUINE, QUIDDITIES] ("The world is full of things, variously related, but what, in
addition to all that, are facts? ... The sentence 'Snow is white' is true if and only if it
is a fact that snow is white. Now we have worked the fact, factitious fiction that it is,
into a corner where we can deal it the coup de grace. The combination 'it is a fact
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logical views, "To explain the concept of truth we therefore do not
need to appeal to obscure relations of correspondence and dubious
entities called facts." 49
D. What Courts Say About Facts and Expressions of Facts
Among these three possibilities-facts being "out there," facts
arising from subjective perspectives, and facts being nothing more
than true statements-it seems pretty clear that the legal system
adheres to a correspondence theory: the facts are out there, quite sep-
arate from subjective viewpoints. When we speak of a jury being
charged with "finding" the facts, we mean that the jury makes determi-
nations about prior states of the world "mind-independent" of the
jurors themselves. 50 When practicing law or thinking about the legal
system, perhaps we are, in Felix Cohen's phrase, "prisoners of com-
mon sense, which is usually the metaphysics of 500 years back."5 1
And yet if lawyers, judges, and jurors hold to a correspondence
theory of facts, there is a certain lack of rigor in any judicial pro-
nouncement that "facts are not copyrightable," 52 that "there can be
no valid copyright in facts,"53 or that "[n]o author may copyright...
the facts he narrates. '54 If a fact is "out there" in the world, then quite
typically it is not "fixed in [a] tangible medium."55 That it rained in
Chicago last night, that Ella Fitzgerald played a concert at Deutsch-
landhalle, Berlin on February 13, 1960,56 that you said "I love you" to
someone yesterday-none of these facts "out there" are fixed at all.
that' is vacuous and can be dropped; 'It is a fact that snow is white' reduces to 'Snow is
white.'").
49 COLIN McGINN, THE MAKING OF A PHILOSOPHER 93 (2003).
50 Defamation and negligent misrepresentation are bodies of law that also run on
a fact/opinion distinction. As limited by our First Amendmentjurisprudence, there is
no defamation liability if one makes "a general statement of opinion, not a positive
assertion of fact." Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703, 718 (Cal. Ct. App.
2002); see also Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (establishing a
four-part test for distinguishing factual assertions from statements of opinion in defa-
mation cases). Under the common law, statements of opinion could be grounds for
defamation, but over time a "fair comment" privilege arose to protect public debate.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 cmt. a (1977).
51 Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REv. 357, 361 (1954).
52 Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344 (1991).
53 Id.
54 Id. at 345 (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 556 (1985)).
55 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
56 ELLA FITZGERALD, MACK THE KNIFE-THE COMPLETE ELLA IN BERLIN (Verve
Records 1960).
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There may be fixed, historical recordations of the facts, but it is not
the recordations which make the facts facts. That the wingspan of a
Boeing 767-400 aircraft is 51.9 meters57 or that the Todaiji temple in
Nara, Japan is the largest wood structure in the world 58 are facts that
are "fixed" in a sense, although not as traditionally understood in cop-
yright law. In other words, if facts are out there, then broadly speak-
ing, they are not even in the ballpark of copyright.
By the lights of the correspondence theory, what judges and legal
scholars are actually discussing are representations or statements of facts.
Occasionally, judicial opinions capture this point precisely. Thus,
Judge Roney on the Fifth Circuit wrote that "[i] t is well settled that
copyright protection extends only to the author's expression offacts and
not to the facts themselves, '59 and Judge Easterbrook on the Seventh
Circuit noted that "core equations, such as the famous E=MC2, express
'facts.' "60
On the other hand, when a distinguished judge or scholar just
says facts are not protected by copyright law, he or she is engaged in a
form of shorthand that is more than just imprecision. It is a subcon-
scious application of copyright's merger doctrine. With most ideas,
there seems to be many ways to express each idea, so that cleaving
expression and idea is relatively easy. But facts are a different matter.
Cleaving the fact and its expression is not so easy because "generally
speaking, there are few ways of depicting, rendering, or expressing
facts." 6' This is particularly true with quantitative conclusions. With
any fact or idea expressed in Hindu-Arabic numbers, the idea or fact
seems inextricably "merged" with its expression because there is no
other reasonable way to express the idea/fact. 62
57 Boeing, 767 Family: Technical Characteristics, Boeing 767-400ER, http://
www.boeing.com/commercial/767family/pf/pfI400prod.html (last visited Oct. 22,
2007).
58 See, e.g., BETH REIBER &JANIE SPENCER, FROMMER'S JAPAN 6 (8th ed. 2006).
59 Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1368 (5th Cir. 1981)
(emphasis added); see also Feist, 499 U.S. at 348 ("Others may copy the underlying
facts from [a] publication, but not the precise words used to present them.").
60 Am. Dental Ass'n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass'n, 126 F.3d 977, 979 (7th Cir. 1997)
(emphasis added).
61 Skinder-Strauss Assocs. v. Mass. Continuing Legal Educ., Inc., 914 F. Supp. 665,
672-73 (D. Mass. 1995).
62 At least not in this time and culture. See ALFRED W. CROSBY, THE MEASURE OF
REALIr 115 (1997) (describing the gradual triumph of Hindu-Arabic numbers over
Roman numbers as western European societies became increasingly sophisticated in
mathematics and commerce); CHARLES SEIFE, ZERO 67-81 (2000) (same). Of course,
as discussed above, in a few cases the idea and its expression in Hindu-Arabic num-
bers seem less merged, i.e., where a temperature can be expressed in Fahrenheit or
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Loose discussion that "facts" are not protected by copyright inad-
vertently points to the "tightness" between facts (out there) and the
expression of facts. Consider this statement from Feist.
Thus, if the compilation author clothes facts with an original collo-
cation of words, he or she may be able to claim a copyright in this
written expression. Others may copy the underlying facts from the
publication, but not the precise words used to present them ...
Where the compilation author adds no written expression but
rather lets the facts speak for themselves, the expressive element is
more elusive.
6 3
Under this standard, when I write, "That first morning in February on
Park Avenue, the temperature nudged just above freezing and stuck there," I
have "clothed" a fact in protectable "expression." But imagine my
journal instead showing the following: Feb. 1, 2004, morning-Park
Avenue-33' F. ForJustice O'Connor, the expressive element here is
"elusive." But it is not elusive at all. There is "expression"-words
fixed on paper-unoriginal, but expression nonetheless. The tight-
ness between fact and statement of fact is summarized well by John
Searle: "Because statements determine their own truth conditions and
because the term 'fact' refers to that in virtue of which statements are
true, the canonical way to specify the fact is the same as the way to
specify the statement, by stating it." 6 4
If we substitute the copyright term "expression" for the philoso-
pher's "statement," we have a succinct rendering of the problem in
copyright law: the canonical way to specify the fact is the same as the
way to specify the expression of the fact, i.e., by expressing it.
II. HuMAN FACTs-HISTORICAL, SOCIAL, CREATED
The Feist characterization of facts fits well with the geographic
facts explorers discovered when mapping the coast of the New World
or with the when and where a particular animal died (leaving behind
fossil remains).65 These are features of the world that are "intrinsic to
Centigrade (or Kelvin); where the Super Bowl designation is common in either
Roman or Hindu-Arabic numbers. In the musical The Hidden Sky, in a future society
the few allowed to learn mathematics at all are forced to use Roman numbers but
secretly learn and practice the dark art of Hindu-Arabic numbers. Videotape: The
Hidden Sky (Prince Music Theater 2000) (based on URSULA K. LEGUIN, The Masters,
in THE WIND'S TWELVE QuARTERs 41 (1975)).
63 Feist, 499 U.S. at 348-49.
64 SEARLE, supra note 37, at 219.
65 For discussions of the fossil record, see generally STEPHEN JAY GOULD, WONDER-
FUL LIFE 64-79 (1989) (describing the setting of the Burgess Shale); SIMON CONWAY
MORR.s, THE CRUCIBLE OF CREATION 53-56 (1998) (discussing the development of a
20071
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
nature."66 Contrast these with the height of the Chrysler Building or a
Mayan temple, the itinerary of a political candidate or of a soccer
mom-these facts are the result of human agency. Among such
"human facts," some facts result from the cumulative, uncoordinated
actions of humans (the population of Los Angeles on July 4, 2007)
and some result from the intentional actions of individual people or
coordinated groups of people (those who wrote the script for the film
L.A. Confidential). For either kinds of human fact, some seem to
become permanent, independent features of the world. As Lawrence
Friedman writes, "No doubt the average person in France or Italy
thinks there is something quite specific about French or Italian
nationality; that these are clear-cut categories of the world, as real as
mountains and rivers; and that somehow the nation was always meant
to be."'6 7 Of course, divisions among nationalities are facts created by
all kinds of human interactions over years. On the other hand, street
names and street addresses are facts created by an identifiable individ-
ual or individuals. As Wendy Gordon writes, "[O]ne's address does
not cease to be a fact upon a showing that the name of one's street
originated in the fancy of a housing developer."
68
This immediately puts us in a position to see how things are much
more complicated than the Feist opinion suggests. With street
addresses collected in the census, some human(s) create the facts and
another human collects them-there is both creation and "discovery."
And when a local telephone company publishes a telephone direc-
tory, it collects some human facts that pre-existed (customer names)
and other facts that it itself created (the phone numbers). The per-
son who is publishing the expressions of the telephone number facts
seems to be the same person who "created" those facts. 69 The same
hypothesis for the evolution of ancient worms from the fossil record in Burgess
Shale).
66 SEARLE, supra note 37, at 9.
67 LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, THE HORIZONTAL SOCIETY 82-83 (1999).
68 Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitution-
ary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 154 n.21 (1992). The mini-taxonomy of facts in these
paragraphs does not correspond to the classic distinctions that have been developed
in philosophy, such as the concept of a "brute fact" or a "social fact." For the classic
formulation of the former, see generally G.E.M. Anscombe, On Brute Facts, 18 ANALY-
sis 69 (1958). A "brute fact" is also used more generally to describe "the terminus of a
series of explanations" that is itself not further reducible. John Haldane, Brute Fact, in
THE OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHl, supra note 37, at 111, 111. For a classic
theory of social facts separate from Searle, see EMiLE DURKHEIM, THE RuLEs OF SOCiO-
LOGICAL METHOD 50-60 (Steven Lukes ed., W.D. Halls trans., 1982).
69 At least for those local service customers whose telephone companies print
their own telephone books. The process of creating the number may, of course, still
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could even be said of what our legal system calls "mixed questions of
law and fact," i.e., where the raw facts are admitted (the car plowed
into the storefront; X was driving the car) and "the issue is whether
the facts satisfy the statutory standard"70 (Xwas negligent). When the
court makes such a determination and certifies its opinion for publica-
tion, the entity publishing the expression (the opinion) is the same
person who "created" the fact (X was negligent).
A. The "Created Fact" as a Kind of Human Fact
Still this does not yet focus on the "created fact" problem. For
one thing, the telephone company probably created the telephone
number well before it published the expression of the telephone
number. For another thing, the telephone company would have cre-
ated the telephone numbers even if there was to be no telephone
book; telephone numbers are necessary for telephone switching
equipment to work. Unlisted telephone numbers are created-and
are "facts"-even if they are never expressed.
So, let us draw one further distinction. Most human facts are
"side effects" of human activity-as in the Ella Fitzgerald concert, "I
love you," and Los Angeles population examples. Contrast this with
human facts that result from an act that was the intentional creation of
information qua information through the intentional creation of expression
qua expression. I will call these "created facts" or "authored facts. '71
For example, computer modeling and simulation now generate much
of our social science and public policy data. Numbers for current
population, traffic flows, or economic levels are treated as facts
although they are often numbers extrapolated from sampling (real
Feistian observational facts) combined with human guesses/judg-
ments/opinions. 72 Complex computer simulations that provide esti-
lack originality. See David Nimmer, Copyright in the Dead Sea Scrolls: Authorship and
Originality, 38 Hous. L. REv. 1, 97-98 (2001) (noting that the telephone numbers
were not antecedent facts, but still can lack originality).
70 Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1982).
71 Thus, this is a much narrower idea than Wendy Gordon's use of the phrase
"created fact" to refer to facts related to human-created artifacts. See Wendy J.
Gordon, Reality as Artifact: From Feist to Fair Use, 55 LAw & CONTE'MP. PROBS. 93,
98-100 (Spring 1992).
72 An example of this is the "Transportation Analysis Simulation System" (TRAN-
SIMS) developed at Los Alamos National Laboratory. TRANSIMS "extrapolates US
Census data to create a synthetic population, which is assigned activities-such as driv-
ing to work-based on diaries kept by selected residents of the studied area. TRAN-
SIMS then factors in transit-system constraints and simulates traffic flow... ." Verge,
WIRE,Jan. 2001, at 236, 236; see also Gina Kolata, Why Some Numbers Are Only Very Good
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mates of prehistoric animal migration patterns or dispersal patterns
for explosive devices that have never been constructed give us
datapoints that are "created," but which we treat as facts. 73 But cre-
ated facts need not be so esoteric, as we will see in Parts III, IV, and V.
B. Facts, Values, and Social Reality
The "factness" of the original expression at issue in the copyright
cases discussed below comports with John Searle's broader project of
showing how social reality relates to the rest of reality, i.e., how some
facts arise from human agreement.74 Searle's basic thesis is that
"there are portions of the real world, objective facts in the world, that are
only facts by human agreement." 75 Searle analyzes this human agree-
ment, i.e., the establishment of social conventions, as what he calls
"collective intentionality. ' '76
Institutions, occupations, membership in groups, our particular
jobs, our familial relations and status are all established by social con-
ventions which require representations, language, and-almost
always-fixed expressions. A basic characteristic of these "social facts"
is that they are language dependent (for our purposes, we could say
"expression dependent"). In Searle's proposal, a social fact depends
on mental representations which, in turn, require expressive commu-
nication among persons. As Searle notes, "[M]arriages and money,
unlike mountains and atoms, do not exist independently of all repre-
sentations."77 The representations (or expressions) constitute com-
munication among people; when that communication leads to
collective acceptance of the new, additional reality, we have a "social
fact."'78 Thus, Searle's overall project is to show how additional,
human-created, intention-laden reality gets overlaid on top of "brute"
reality, producing different sorts of facts through social agreement.
Those commonly accepted facts are distinct from all the beliefs, theo-
Guesses, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2001, § 4, at WK5 (describing the reason for the estimat-
ing process in census).
73 Poovey makes a similar observation and calls such datapoints "a post-modern
variant of the fact." POOVEY, supra note 23, at 2-3.
74 SEARLE, supra note 37, at 1-6; JOHN R. SEARLE, SPEECH Ac'rs, 50-53 (1969)
[hereinafter SEARLE, SPEECH Acrs].
75 SEARLE, supra note 37, at 1 (emphasis added).
76 Id. at 26, 122.
77 Id. at 190. For Searle, "a fact is language independent if that very fact requires
no linguistic elements for its existence." Id. at 61.
78 See id. at 111 (describing the "primitive logical operation" by which institu-
tional reality is created).
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ries, opinions, and ideas on which we differ and we know we differ.79
This distinction between such "facts" and opinions is commonplace,
but as Robert Post says in the context of defamation law, "it is also
deeply obscure, and it has proved resistant to most analytic attempts at
clarification." 80 More or less unnoticed, this is a deep and fundamen-
tal problem in the series of cases we now consider.
III. THE PROTECTION OF NAMING FACTS
When an individual or group gives a name to something-and
that name sticks-we have perhaps the most basic of social facts.
When Augustine and Mary Ball Washington named their first child
"George,"8' when Spanish settlers called their encampment "El
Pueblo de Nuestra Sefiora la Reyna de los Angeles del Rio Porci-
uncula" (shortened by an early tourist board to Los Angeles), or when
an Apple researcher dubbed one of their projects "Carl Sagan,"8 2 each
of these acts produced a social fact. These acts of naming can have
great importance (as in Malvinas versus Falklands or with new corpo-
rate names like Verizon or Exxon).83
In the face of this importance, copyright law has a long-standing
rule that "[w]ords and short phrases such as names, titles, and slo-
gans" are not copyrightable. 84 Elsewhere, I have discussed reasons for
this bar, including how adequate incentives for these short expres-
sions are already provided by markets, law (trademark law), and
79 This connects nicely with Robert Post's argument that a public discourse of the
kind protected by the First Amendment is characterized by discourse across ethnic,
religious, and social communities which requires agreement on certain things, but
not all things. "The conduct of public discourse," Post wrote, "requires persons to
share standards, but not the kind of standards that fuse them into a [single] commu-
nity." Post, supra note 31, at 636. Post further makes a persuasive argument that
"facts" as the Court has described them in defamation law are things on which we can
expect agreement or "convergence." Id. at 657-58.
80 Id. at 649-50.
81 See, e.g., JOSEPH J. ELLIS, His EXCELLENCY 7-8 (2005).
82 See Sagan v. Apple Computer, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 1072, 1074 (C.D. Cal. 1994)
(describing how Apple had allegedly given a development project the internal name
"Carl Sagan," but when this fact was publicized Sagan demanded his name not be
used; Apple technicians changed the project's code name to "Butt-Head
Astronomer").
83 Or as experienced by the character in Johnny Cash's 1968 classic "A Boy
Named Sue." JOHNNY CASH, AT FoLsoM PRISON (Columbia Records 1968).
84 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (2007) (indicating that "[w]ords and short phrases such as
names, titles, and slogans; familiar symbols or designs; mere variations of typographic
ornamentation, lettering or coloring; mere listing of ingredients or contents" are not
copyrightable).
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noneconomic motives.8 5 But another ground to justify the bar on
copyrighted names and tiles' is that they function as social facts in
which the fact and expression are always merged. You cannot say "Xis
called Y' without expressing Y. And having names for things-both
general and proper names-is fundamental to communicating any
other facts. 86 To name something is to establish a fact,87 and yet there
is no sensible way to argue that these are acts of "discovery" unless we
are prepared to reduce all creativity to an act of discovery.8 8
If you cannot copyright "THX-1138" as the name of a feature
film8 9 or "TVC15" as the name of a song,90 then you should get no
copyright protection for "THX" as the name of a sound system or for
"1138" as a designation for a replacement part. Yet this bar against
copyrighting names has been threatened by disputes involving what
are basically designation systems. Let us consider three such cases.
A. The AMA and ADA Cases
Beginning in the 1960s, the American Medical Association
(AMA) developed a coding system for medical procedures, the Physi-
85 Hughes, supra note 7, at 610-19.
86 So, it is no wonder that in Genesis Adam names all the animals even before Eve
is created. Genesis 2:19 (KingJames) ("And out of the ground the LORD God formed
every beast of the field, and every fowl of the air; and brought them unto Adam to see
what he would call them: and whatsoever Adam called every living creature, that was
the name thereof."). My thanks to David Nimmer for this interesting point.
87 Naming as establishment of a social fact has the same structure as government
declarations. Searle gives the example of money: "When the Treasury says it is legal
tender, they are declaring it to be legal tender, not announcing an empirical fact that
it already is legal tender." SEARLE, supra note 37, at 55. Naming one's child, one's
pet, or one's new car part has the same structure; by convention, we agree that you
are entitled to declare the name of this thing.
88 The "discovery" notion of creativity pops up repeatedly, particularly in regard
to great art. For example, Einstein is said to have characterized Mozart's music as "so
pure that it seemed to have been ever-present in the universe, waiting to be discov-
ered by the master." Arthur I. Miller, A Genius Finds Inspiration in the Music of Another,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2006, at F3. In Orhan Pamuk's novel Snow, the main character
believes that the better poems he is writing "always seem[ to come from outside,
from far away."' OuRHAN PAMUK, SNOW 122 (2004); see also QUINE, QUmDITIES, supra
note 48, at 39 ("Creation and discovery, here as in theoretical science, are all of one
piece.");Justin Hughes, The Personality Interest of Artists and Inventors in Intellectual Prop-
erty, 16 CARDOZo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 81,, 142-46 (1998) (criticizing the artistic notions of
"capture," "the muses," and "creativity-as-discovery" as paradigms).
89 For George Lucas' 1971 feature film directorial debut, see THX-1138 (Warner
Bros. Pictures 1971).
90 DAVID BOWIE, STATION TO STATION (RCA Records 1976).
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cians' Current Procedural Terminology (CPT).91 The CPT gives five-
digit codes to various medical procedures. 92 For example, "90717"
designates a yellow fever vaccination, and "92950" designates
"[c]ardiopulmonary resuscitation." 9 3  A decade later, Congress
instructed the Medicaid program to develop a uniform code for iden-
tifying physicians' services. 94 Rather than creating a coding system de
novo, the Department of Health and Human Services sensibly
adopted the CPT. 95
For years, Practice Management made bulk purchases of the CPT
for resale, but following a dispute about its discount from the AMA,
Practice Management filed suit to have the CPT copyright declared
invalid. In Practice Management Information Corp. v. American Medical
Ass'n, Practice Management first argued that the AMA forfeited the
CPT copyright when it allowed the CPT to be integrated into Medi-
caid regulations.9 6 The Ninth Circuit disagreed, concluding, first,
that the incentive structure was different: while 'judges' salaries pro-
vided adequate incentive to write opinions .. . [the] copyrightability
of the CPT provides the economic incentive for the AMA to produce
and maintain the CPT. ' '97 As to due process concerns about availabil-
ity of the legally mandated codes, the appellate panel concluded that
there was no evidence that the AMA had foreclosed public access to
the codes and that there were adequate, less draconian tools to ensure
such access.98
The appellate panel was much more sympathetic to Practice Man-
agement's second argument-that the AMA had "misused" its copy-
91 Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 121 F.3d 516, 517 (9th Cir.
1997), amended by 133 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 1998).
92 Id.
93 AM. MED. ASS'N, CURRENT PROCEDURAL TERMINOLOCY 299, 311 (2007).
94 Practice Mgmt., 121 F.3d at 517.
95 Id. at 518; see also CAL. CODE RECS. tit. 22, § 51050 (2007) ("HCPCS [Health
Care Financing Administration's Common Procedure Coding System] consists of the
Physicians' Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) .... To the extent not elsewhere
adopted in these regulations, HCPCS, and each of its subsequent updates, is herein
incorporated by reference into these regulations.")
96 Practice Mgmt., 121 F.3d at 518.
97 Id. The court pointed out the increasing trend of governments, on cost sav-
ings grounds, to rely on "model" codes and statutes written by nongovernmental enti-
ties, which would lend a note of irony to any holding that such privately-created works
should lose their copyright protection on adoption. See id. at 518-19 nn.4-5.
98 Id. at 519. Such tools included fair use, due process defenses for infringers on
a case-by-case basis, mandatory licensing, the federal government adopting a different
code if the AMA became too restrictive in its distribution practices (de-lawing the
work, as it were), and the federal government "by regulation or contract requir[ing]
the AMA to provide greater access." Id. at 519 n.7.
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right by obtaining a commitment from the federal authorities to use
the CPT designations exclusively for Medicaid forms.99 The panel's
"copyright misuse" conclusion may be factually suspect,100 but this res-
olution prevented the Practice Management panel from applying any
fine-toothed analysis to the issue of what was protected by the copy-
right over the CPT. That job was taken up by Judge Easterbrook in
the contemporaneous and curiously parallel American Dental Ass'n v.
Delta Dental Plans Ass'n.1° 1
Just as the AMA had created the CPT, the American Dental Asso-
ciation had created the Code on Dental Procedures and Nomenclature
("ADA Code")-a taxonomy in which each dental procedure has (a) a
long description, (b) a short description, and (c) a number designa-
tion. 10 2 Delta Dental published Universal Coding and Nomenclature, a
work which "include[d] most of the numbering system and short
descriptions from the ADA's Code."10 3 When the ADA sued, the dis-
trict court concluded that the ADA Code was not copyrightable sub-
ject matter, reasoning that the ADA Code was only a "useful"
taxonomy and, therefore, lacked the modicum of creativity necessary
for copyright. 10 4
Judge Easterbrook rejected this reasoning, pointing to the many
useful works (software, architectural drawings, maps) protected by
copyright law 1 5 and opining that "[c]lassification is a creative
endeavor."10 6 He concluded that the long descriptions in the ADA
Code were unquestionably copyrightable and that the "original long
99 Id. at 520.
100 This conclusion may be suspect because there was apparently no evidence that
the AMA had insisted upon this contractual term. In its appellate brief to the Ninth
Circuit, Practice Management argued that "[t]he AMA purposely sought and
obtained the government's promise to mandate the CPT as the only way to collect
federal health care money" but did not cite to any evidence adduced at trial support-
ing this point. Brief of Appellant, Practice Management Information Corp. at 5, Prac-
tice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 121 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1995) (No. 94-
56774). Practice Management recognized that the district court determined "that
'the AMA did not coerce' [the government] to adopt the CPT," id. at 6, and that, at
trial, Practice Management had "never argued the AMA coerced HCFA," id. at 33.
Just because a term is in a contract, it does not follow that the copyright holder "con-
ditioned" entering into the contract on that term; the federal government might have
made the original offer to use the CPT designations exclusively-since it would be
inefficient to have two code systems.
101 126 F.3d 977 (7th Cir. 1997).
102 Id. at 977.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 978.
105 Id. at 978-79.
106 Id. at 979.
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descriptions make the work as a whole copyrightable"' 07-two vanilla-
plain conclusions. Judge Easterbrook's analysis then moved in a
much more troubling direction, opining that "even the short descrip-
tions and the numbers are original works of authorship."' 018 Notice
that he says "works";10 9 the ADA numbers were, in effect, names for
dental procedures, and Easterbrook's language suggests that each
name merits independent copyright protection. Elsewhere I have
extensively criticized Judge Easterbrook's suggestion that a single
number could be an independently copyrighted "literary work," and
Judge Easterbrook's opinion takes a couple steps back from this preci-
pice.110 But the important point here is to see that copyright is being
recognized either in a set of names or in individual names and that
these names function as facts as surely as street addresses-they are
the only practical way to refer to the particular medical and dental
procedures just as your home address is the only practical way to refer
to the particular place where you live. In both of these cases, the tax-
onomies produce facts.
B. Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp.
Southco manufactured hardware, including a line of fasteners.1"1
Each of its fastener models was designated with a nine-digit number in
which different digits "denote[d] functional characteristics of each
product, for example, installation type, thread size, recess type (phil-
107 Id.
108 Id. This statement, implying individual "work" status for each number, actually
appears in the opinion before the more general and less worrisome conclusion that
"all three elements of the [ADA] Code-numbers, short descriptions, and long
descriptions, are copyrightable subject matter." Id.
109 Id.
110 Although this passage of the opinion expressly says that each short description
and each number is an original work of authorship, the opinion then throws some
doubt on the statement that short descriptions and numbers are original works of
authorship by stating that it was not finding that the ADA Code was a compilation
work under 17 U.S.C. § 103. Id. at 980. Judge Easterbrook also reasons that the
§ 102(b) bar on copyright in ideas, systems, and processes would "permit[ ] Delta to
disseminate forms inviting dentists to use the ADA's Code when submitting bills to
insurers" and also "precludes the ADA from suing, for copyright infringement, a den-
tist whose office files record treatments using the Code's nomenclature." Id. at 981.
But if each number were an independent "work," it makes less sense that a dentist
copying just a few number designations (each a separate "work") would be protected
by § 102(b)'s bar on copyrighting methods of operation. For further criticism, see
Hughes, supra note 7, at 577 (contending that the quantity of protected material
should factor into its copyrightability).
111 Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., No. 99-4337, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112, at
*1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 12, 2000), rev'd, 258 F.3d 148 (3d Cir. 2001).
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lips or slotted), grip length, type of material and knob finish."' 12 The
Southco numbering system had become, to some degree, an industry
standard." 3 Nonetheless, there was no evidence that Southco had
ever licensed the numbering system to third parties or that it had
developed the numbering system with a mind to marketing it as
such. 114
The defendant Kanebridge published comparison charts showing
Southco part numbers with their counterpart Kanebridge part num-
bers.' 15 On occasion, Kanebridge also labeled its parts with Southco
numbers. Southco alleged that Kanebridge had "copied some or all"
of fifty-one particular part numbers from a Southco handbook which
contained over one thousand discrete part numbers. 116 The U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted a prelimi-
nary injunction against Kanebridge, concluding that "Southco [was]
likely to succeed in establishing that its product identification num-
bers are copyrightable" (notice, again, the plural) and that
Kanebridge could be liable for copying "Southco's numbering
system."1 17
In the first of three trips to the Court of Appeals, the appellate
panel reversed on the grounds that the numbers "fail[ed] to satisfy
the originality requirement,"" 8 that the district court had not distin-
guished between copyright in "the numbering system" and "the actual
numbers produced by the system,"1 19 and that the rigorous nature of
112 Id. at *2.
113 Id. at *9; see Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 258 F.3d 148, 150 (3d Cir.
2001).
114 Southco, 258 F.3d at 152.
115 Id. at 150,
116 Southco, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112, at *3, *13. The "copied" Southco numbers
came either from a Southco "Handbook" or a supplement to one of the company
Handbooks. Id. at *3.
117 Id. at *13 (emphasis added). In prior part number cases, courts had con-
cluded that the taxonomies lacked originality because of randomness. Mitel, Inc. v.
Iqtel, Inc., 124 F.3d 1366, 1373-74 (10th Cir. 1997) ("Mitel's arbitrary selection of a
combination of three or four numbers required de minimis creative effort. Mitel's
own witnesses testified to the arbitrariness of the command codes .... We agree with
the district court that the random and arbitrary use of numbers in the public domain
does not evince enough originality to distinguish authorship."); Toro Co. v. R & R
Prods. Co., 787 F.2d 1208, 1213 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that there was no copyright
in part numbers because the numbering system was "arbitrary and random," as
opposed to a system that used symbols according to a meaningful pattern).
118 Southco, 258 F.3d at 151.
119 Id. (acknowledging the same distinction drawn in the amicus brief from the
U.S. Government). The author participated in the drafting of that brief. After draw-
ing the distinction above, the U.S. amicus brief also raised the issue whether any use
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Southco's numbering system "makes it impossible for the numbers
themselves to be original."' 20 On remand, the trial court granted
summary judgment for the defendant despite a new declaration from
a Southco employee asserting that he did indeed apply judgment and
creativity in establishing new parts numbers for Southco. 121 On this
basis, a different Third Circuit panel reversed the grant of summary
judgment, saying a genuine issue of copyrightability in the parts num-
bers had been raised. 122
Prompted by U.S. government intervention, the Third Circuit
granted rehearing en banc, and an opinion written by now Justice
Alito put to rest the claim that individual numbers designating (nam-
ing) parts could be individually copyrighted. The en banc Southco III
decision 123 announced that Southco's part numbers were not copy-
rightable for two separate reasons: (a) "the Southco product numbers
are not 'original' because each number is rigidly dictated by the rules
of the Southco [numbering] system"; 124 and (b) "[t]he Southco part
numbers are also excluded from copyright protection because they
are analogous to short phrases or the titles of works."' 125 Although the
court of appeals recognized that the part numbers were "analogous
to . . . titles,"126 none of the parties pursued the obvious next step: if
these part names had become industry standards, the names were
social facts-facts by common agreement just as that green rectangu-
lar paper is commonly agreed to be a twenty dollar bill-that had
become basic to carrying out nonexpressive activities.
of Southco's "system" could infringe a protectable copyright interest given the bar to
the protection of methods of operation in 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). Brief Amicus Curiae of
the United States of America Urging Reversal in Support of Appellant Kanebridge
Corp. at 14 & n.12, Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 258 F.3d 148 (3d Cir. 2001)
(No. 00-1102) [hereinafter Brief Amicus Curiae].
120 Southco, 258 F.3d at 153. The U.S. had argued that the Southco numbers
lacked creativity because each number was the result of the "mechanical application
of a set of rules to well-defined physical characteristics of a retractable captive-screw
assembly," Brief Amicus Curiae, supra note 119, at 12, such that, as the trial court
found, once a third party was familiar with Southco's rules for numbering, that per-
son would know the part's "size, finish, and utility" based "on the content and
arrangement of its product number." Southco, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112 at *11, *13.
121 Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp. (Southco II), 324 F.3d 190, 194 (3d Cir.
2003), rev'd en banc, 390 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2004).
122 Id. at 196.
123 Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp. (Southco II1), 390 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2004)
(en banc).
124 Id. at 282.
125 Id. at 285. Interestingly, three Third Circuit judges (Becker, McKee, and
Smith) did not join this portion of the en banc decision. See id. at 277 n.*.
126 Id. at 285.
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IV. THE PROTECTION OF EVALUATIVE FACTS
While the drift toward protecting names was stopped in the Third
Circuit, eerily similar trends have not clearly abated in the Second and
Ninth Circuits. In these cases, private parties have made evaluations-
qualitative or quantitative-and courts have intimated that such origi-
nal evaluations may be individually protected under copyright law.
Obviously "evaluations" and "designations" overlap to some degree;
the CPT and ADA Codes were also "evaluative" in their many taxo-
nomic decisions. 127 As with designations, the evaluations in the cases
below can become so widely accepted and so relied upon for substan-
tial nonexpressive activities that they become social facts.
A. CCC Information Services v. Maclean Hunter
Maclean Hunter publishes the well-known Red Book, listing used
car valuations for different parts of the United States. 128 These valua-
tions were "the editors' projections of the values for the next six weeks
of 'average' versions of most of the used cars (up to seven years old)
sold in that region."'129 The court recognized that the Red Book was
one of two leading valuation books, so much so that some state laws
mandated the use of valuations from both books in calculating
required insurance payments for the loss of a vehicle. 130 The defen-
dant CCC Information Services distributed an online database of used
car valuations to its customers by "loading major portions of the Red
Book onto its computer network and republishing Red Book informa-
tion in various forms to its customers."' 3' The trial court found that
127 Complex labeling systems, particularly of technical or technological matters,
tend toward the evaluative. But there are no hard and fast rules. Technical equip-
ment can be given names that are evaluative (BMW's automobiles-325Ci, 540i,
740iL) or very evocative (Chevrolet's "Impala," "Corvair," and "Malibu"). Newly dis-
covered comets and planetoids receive a numeric designation from the International
Astronomical Union's Committee on Small Bodies Names; the object can later have a
more evocative name chosen by the discoverer and approved by the committee. See,
e.g., Livia Giacomini, From 2000WR106 to Varuna: How are Asteroids Named?, TUMBLING
STONE, Mar. 15, 2001, http://spaceguard.esa.int/tumblingstone/issues/nom2/var-
una.htm.
128 CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 63 (2d
Cir. 1994).
129 Id.
130 Id. at 64 (discussing the National Automobile Dealers Association's "Bluebook"
and noting that "the laws of certain states use th[e] average figure [from the two




"numerous Red Book customers ha[d] canceled their subscriptions,
opting instead to purchase CCC's services."' 132
Nonetheless, the trial court granted summary judgment for CCC,
finding that the valuations were unprotectable facts or, alternatively,
expressions of ideas which had merged with the underlying ideas. 133
The Second Circuit reversed, reasoning that the selection and
arrangement of the Red Book was protectable, that the Red Book num-
bers were themselves protectable expression, and that merger did not
apply. 134 As did Judge Easterbrook, Judge Leval moved from
unremarkable propositions about copyright law to intimations of
alarmingly broad copyright protection.
As a first step, the court found sufficient originality in the selec-
tion and arrangement of the Red Book's valuations. Judge Leval found
that originality was expressed in the particular regions into which
Maclean had divided the country, implying that the selection of
regions was "original" because it produces inaccurate car values:
A car model does not command the same value throughout a large
geographic sector of the United States .... A 1989 Dodge Caravan
will not command the same price in San Diego as in Seattle. In
furnishing a single number to cover vast regions that undoubtedly
contain innumerable variations, the Red Book expresses a loose
judgment that values are likely to group together with greater con-
sistency within a defined region than without. The number pro-
duced is necessarily both approximate and original. 135
The court also pointed to other "selection" decisions that appeared to
manifest originality, including Maclean's "selection of the number of
years' models to be included in the compilation" (seven years) and
"the selection and manner of presentation of optional features for
inclusion." 13 6  This reasoning that choices that do not seem to be
dictated by extrinsic considerations are original is, again, straightfor-
ward copyright doctrine, 37 although Leval's connection-that such
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 64-73.
135 Id. at 67.
136 Id. Judge Leval also considered that "the adjustment of mileage by 5,000 mile
increments (as opposed to using some other breakpoint and interval)" was a creative
choice, id. at 67-68, but this seems wrong. Five thousand and/or ten thousand mile
increments seems like an unoriginal, pedestrian choice.
137 The same reasoning can be seen in two pre-Feist decisions recognizing copy-
right in nonfiction database products. In DowJones & Co. v. Board of Trade, 546 F.
Supp. 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), the court recognized copyright in DowJones' list of what
companies produce the Dow Jones average because "Dow's lists evidence a high
degree of selectivity and subjective judgment." Id. at 116. Similarly, in Eckes v. Card
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choices will produce inaccurate evaluations-is more candid than
usual.
But were the Red Book valuations, as the trial court thought,
(expressions of) "facts"?'38 Judge Leval quickly and correctly con-
cluded that the items in the Red Book were not Feistian facts because
the Red Book entries were not "pre-existing facts that had merely been
discovered by the Red Book editors. To the contrary, Maclean's evi-
dence demonstrated without rebuttal that its valuations were neither
reports of historical prices nor mechanical derivations of historical
prices or other data."'139 .
Instead, they were "predictions... based not only on a multitude
of data sources, but also on professional judgment and expertise.' 140
As such, "[t]he valuations themselves [were] original creations of
Maclean." 14 1
By honing to the Feistian definition, Leval avoided addressing
how people use these numeric valuations as facts: the car salesman
tells you that your car is worth Xdollars or the state insurance adjuster
says its replacement value is Y. But even while rejecting the "factness"
of these values, Leval recognized that the numbers were nonetheless
subject to a merger argument: "[E]ach entry in the Red Book
expresses the authors' idea of the value of a particular vehicle ...
[and] such expression is indispensable to the statement of the idea
and therefore merges with the idea,' so that the expression is also not
protectible."'142 Given what the merger doctrine is supposed to do-
keep facts and ideas from being propertized-it is hard to see how the
merger doctrine could not apply in such circumstances. Indeed,
Judge Leval recognized that this merger argument was "not easily
rebutted."143
Price Update, 736 F.2d 859 (2d Cir. 1984), the defendant was accused of copying plain-
tiffs selection of which cards counted as "premium" cards in the world of collecting
baseball cards. Id. at 862. The court found that there was "no doubt that appellants
exercised selection, creativity and judgment in choosing among the 18,000 or so dif-
ferent baseball cards in order to determine which were the 5,000 premium cards." Id.
at 863. See generally Hughes, supra note 88, at 111-19 (reasoning that "[s]omething
will be considered 'creative' only when it appears to come from neither a purely
mechanical process, nor a purely random one").
138 The trial court also called them "interpretations of facts." Maclean Hunter, 44
F.3d at 64.
139 Id. at 67.
140 Id.
141 Id.




Leval's direct rebuttal was a standard tactic: identify the "idea" as
being at a more abstract level. He notes that the Red Book tells the
reader that "[y]ou, the subscriber, must be the final judge of the
actual value of a particular vehicle,"' 4 4 a statement almost certainly
intended to limit Maclean Hunter's legal liability, not engender crea-
tive deviations from its estimates. Nonetheless, Leval leverages it to
launch the proposition that the "idea" at issue is making some valuation
of a particular used car, the idea is not this particular valuation."4 5 If
the Red Book says "$6550," then protecting the expression "$6550"
propertizes neither the general idea of a numeric valuation for this
particular car nor different specific ideas that have expressions like
"$6575," "$6500," or "$6485."
Judge Leval realized that this was not particularly satisfying rea-
soning and presented a more practical way to avoid the merger doc-
trine's "not easily rebutted" implications: a two-level hierarchy of
ideas. The first level is "building block" ideas and the second is "ideas
of [a] weaker category, infused with opinion."' 46 The court reasoned
that merger is not such a bad thing with ideas of "the weaker, sugges-
tion-opinion category. ' 147 Given copyright's intended incentive for
compilations, protection of the expressions of opinion-infused ideas
can be tolerated because restricting access to such expressions "will
not inflict injury on the opportunity for public debate, nor restrict
access to the kind of idea that illuminates our understanding of the
phenomena that surround us or of useful processes to solve our
problems. 1 148 On this utilitarian calculus, the court held that the
merger doctrine should be "withheld" from application to Maclean
Hunter's valuations. 149
B. CDN Inc. v. Kapes
The immediate sequel to Maclean Hunter was the Ninth Circuit's
1999 decision in CDN Inc. v. Kapes. 150 In Kapes, the plaintiff published
the Coin Dealer Newsletter, a weekly report of wholesale prices for col-
lectible United States coins, which "include [d] prices for virtually all
collectible coins and [was] used extensively by dealers."' 51 Defendant
Kapes operated an internet webpage with a "Fair Market Coin Pricer"
144 Id. at 73.





150 197 F.3d 1256 (9th Cir. 1999).
151 Id. at 1258.
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(Pricer) that provided retail prices for many collectible coins. 152 The
retail prices in Kapes' Pricer were derived from the CDN prices by
consistent application of a simple algorithm. 153 The parties stipulated
that the issue of copyrightability of the CDN prices was dispositive of
the case and the trial court concluded CDN's "prices are original cre-
ations, not uncopyrightable facts." 154 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
panel recognized that the sole issue before it was "whether the prices
are copyrightable." 155
Both the trial and appellate courts recognized that the nature of
the numbers in the Coin Dealer Newsletter was quite distinct from that of
the numbers in the Feist telephone books: the CDN wholesale coin
prices were the result of "a process that involves using [the editors']
judgment to distill and extrapolate from factual data."'156 Whereas the
numbers in the telephone book lacked any creative spark, the Ninth
Circuit panel was clear that "[t] his spark glows in CDN's prices, which
are compilations of data chosen and weighed with creativity and judg-
ment."'157 As with Maclean Hunter and Delta Dental, this is regrettable
dicta suggesting that single prices in the respective publications would
count as independently protectable "works."'158
After a succinct exposition of the merger doctrine, the court con-
cluded simply that "accepting the [merger] principle in all cases ...
would eviscerate the protection of the copyright law,"159 the same
basic conclusion as in Maclean Hunter. The next steps in the reason-
ing could have been that the prices are "expressions" of CDN editors'
judgments, that the judgments are the abstract, unprotected ideas
(Judge Leval's first reason to avoid the merger doctrine), and that the
court did not believe merger should apply. Instead, the court (a)
implicitly said that the prices were ideas and (b) explicitly said that
copyright law sometimes protects ideas:
CDN does not, nor could it, claim protection for its idea of creating
a wholesale price guide, but it can use the copyright laws to protect its
idea of what those prices are... Drawing this line preserves the bal-
ance between competition and protection: it allows CDN's competi-
152 Id. at 1257.
153 For example, a twenty-five percent markup means that a CDN wholesale value
of $10.00 would become Kapes' retail price of $12.50, and a CDN $300.00 value would
become Kapes' retail price of $375.00.
154 Id. at 1258.
155 Id. at 1259 (emphasis added).
156 Id. at 1261.
157 Id. at 1260.
158 See Hughes, supra note 7, at 592-95.
159 Kapes, 197 F.3d at 1261.
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tors to create their own price guides . . . but protects CDN's
creation, thus giving it an incentive to create such a guide.... The
doctrine of merger does not bar copyright protection in this
case. 
160
Even treating this language concerning copyright protecting ideas as
dicta, Kapes broadened the scope of protection for such judgments/
evaluations by extending the protection to derivatives from the plain-
tiffs evaluations, not just reproducing the expressions of the plaintiffs
evaluations.
While Kapes seems like a fairly bare-knuckled application of anti-
misappropriation sentiments without sufficient concern for the integ-
rity of copyright doctrine, 16 1 in another sense Kapes did not aggravate
the "created facts" problem beyond Maclean Hunter. There was no
evidence that the CDN wholesale prices were mandated for use in law
and there was less evidence that the CDN prices had become de facto
industry standards than the evaluations in Maclean Hunter. It would
take a few more years before another case again brought the Maclean
Hunter analysis under scrutiny.
C. NYMEX v. IntercontinentalExchange
This case came in 2005 and was brought by the New York Mercan-
tile Exchange (NYMEX), the world's largest exchange for the trading
of commodity futures contracts and an entity regulated by the Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). 16 2 People trading
NYMEX futures contracts (members) must deposit an initial margin
deposit-a performance bond-to cover any losses they suffer.163 As
explained by the district court:
On each day on which a futures contract remains open and
unexpired, the amount of the required margin deposit changes
as the price of the underlying commodity-and thus the value of
the contract-changes. These changes in the value of the contract
are determined by reference to the end-of-day "settlement prices"
for the futures contract. 16 4
160 Id. at 1262 (emphasis added).
161 See, e.g., Karjala, supra note 5, at 480 ("It is evident that CDN simply uses anti-
misappropriation notions to force the defendant to do its own work in determining
the value estimates rather than to protect the creative selection or arrangement of
compiled data, paying only lip service to Feist's elimination of the 'sweat of the brow'
basis for copyright originality.").
162 N.Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 2d
527, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), affd, 497 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2007).
163 Id.
164 Id. at 530.
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The parties disputed how much judgment and creativity went into
these settlement prices, although there was no dispute that they are
not actual prices of single transactions and that the daily settlement
prices are established by a NYMEX "committee."' 65
IntercontinentalExchange (ICE) has its own over-the-counter
futures contracts on two popular NYMEX commodities, and each day
ICE relies on the NYMEX settlement prices for the processing of the
ICE futures contracts. 166 NYMEX claimed that this activity violates its
copyright in the settlement prices.167 When ICE sought declaratory
judgment against NYMEX on the copyright issue, NYMEX "urged the
Court to consider a NYMEX settlement price as a 'creative copyright-
able work' "168 -a result that follows unsurprisingly from Judge Leval's
reasoning in Maclean Hunter (as well as Easterbrook's reasoning in
Delta Dental). 169 NYMEX conceded that "market participants often
provide that the parties will refer to a NYMEX settlement price to
serve as the final settlement price in [over-the-counter] contracts."'170
At the same time, NYMEX counsel expressly argued that "[w]hat is
done with [a settlement price], what we permit to be done with it,"'171
had no bearing on it becoming a fact-an argument obviously at odds
with the claims made here about the nature of social facts.
The district court found that the settlement prices were facts,' 72
but it is clear that Judge Koeltl understood he was treading in an
uncharted quadrant of the Feist universe. On the one hand, the dis-
trict court opined that "NYMEX's settlement prices are the actual
prices," 173 suggesting that the holding relied on placing the NYMEX
settlement prices in the camp of Feistian facts. On the other hand,
165 Id. at 530-31.
166 Id. at 533 ("According to ICE, an OTC swap is generally defined as an agree-
ment whereby a floating price is exchanged for a fixed price over a specified period,
thus allowing a buyer or seller of energy products to 'lock in' a specific price and
avoid the risk of floating prices. The financial purpose of an OTC transaction, there-
fore, is usually the same as the financial purpose of a NYMEX transaction.").
167 Id. In March 2002, NYMEX sought copyright registration for its settlement
prices, expressly comparing the settlement prices to the valuations in Maclean Hunter
and Kapes. When it became clear that the Copyright Office would not grant registra-
tion over the "prices" expressly mentioned as such, NYMEX obtained registration over
publications that include the prices. Id.
168 Id. at 541.
169 See supra Parts IV.A, III.A.
170 N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 389 F. Supp. 2d at 533.
171 Id. at 541.
172 Id. ("The argument that NYMEX settlement prices do not embody facts is with-
out merit.").
173 Id. at 542 ("NYMEX's settlement prices are the actual prices and are the only
way to express the idea of a settlement price stated in numbers.").
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the court adopts a page from Searle's theory on why the prices are
(social) facts: "NYMEX settlement prices are widely publicized and
used as benchmarks by market participants. NYMEX settlement
prices are thus real-world facts used by commodities traders to value
their open positions and trigger margin calls or margin reduc-
tions."' 74 Judge Koeltl then found that the facts and expression of
facts had merged, but carefully hedged his bets throughout the opin-
ion, framing the problem also as one of "idea" and expression having
merged. 75
On appeal, NYMEX continued to follow Maclean Hunter, arguing
that each NYMEX settlement price is the "expression of an informed,
consensus opinion of persons at NYMEX as to what the fair market
value of the contract at the close of trading was"; that the nature of
trading makes the actual prices-the Feistian facts-impossible for
NYMEX to obtain. 176 Not surprisingly, NYMEX's arguments for why
there is no "merger" in this situation-despite widespread external
reference to the settlement prices-tracked Judge Leval's analysis in
Maclean Hunter.177 The U.S. Government intervened against NYMEX,
but was also a little ambivalent in its embrace of the district court con-
clusion that "facts" had been created. 178
174 Id. at 542; see also id. at 543 ("NYMEX settlement prices are a matter of basic
market fact, and therefore, they are not copyrightable.").
175 See id. at 541. Interestingly, Koeltl makes no citation to the Veeck decision,
although that majority en banc decision concluding that the model code had become
"fact" was over two years old by the time of Koeltl's decision. See infra Part V.B.
176 Public Version of Brief for Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellant at 7, N.Y.
Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., No. 05-5585 (2d Cir. 2007)
[hereinafter NYMEX Appeal Brief]. NYMEX's argument acknowledged that the set-
tlement prices are generated pursuant to elaborate rules (a reason used in the Southco
litigation to deny originality to the parts numbers), id. at 10, but continued to claim
that each settlement price was set "virtually entirely in the discretion, judgment and
opinion by the Settlement Price Committee," id. at 12.
177 NYMEX argued that because the opinions used in arriving at the settlement
price can vary from person to person "the idea can result in several different expres-
sions." Id. at 33. The U.S. Government brief savaged this NYMEX argument:
"NYMEX's claim that a settlement price is just one possible expression of a broad, all-
embracing concept is a transparent effort to avoid the merger doctrine." Brief Ami-
cus Curiae of the United States of America in Support of Defendant-Appellee Inter-
continentalExchange, Inc. at 29, N.Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc. v.
IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., No. 05-5585 (2d Cir. 2007) [hereinafter USG Brief].
Adopting Judge Leval's distinction, NYMEX also argued that it does not seek to pro-
tect "building block ideas" but rather ideas in the category of "'approximative state-
ments of opinion."' NYMEX Appeal Brief, supra note 176, at 35 (quoting CCC Info.
Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 72 (2d Cir. 1994)).
178 The brief emphasizes idea/expression merger:
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In August 2007, the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court on
merger grounds only.' 79 Viewing the NYMEX Committee's activities,
the court pointed to the Feist example of census-takers (as discoverers
of fact) and noted that "[w] hile the line between creation and discov-
ery is often clear-cut, we recognize that it is a difficult line to draw in
this case."'180 This left the originality-hence copyrightability-ques-
tion unresolved. Similarly, while the appellate panel noted how the
settlement prices are treated after their creation as facts,18 1 it did so as
almost an estoppel point against NYMEX-and without any recogni-
tion, as in the Veeck case discussed below in Part V.B, of the "created
facts" doctrinal dilemma.
While NYMEX seemed to test the basic soundness of Maclean
Hunter, the court avoided directly confronting its own precedent-
and Kapes-in a couple of ways. First, the court noted that Maclean
Hunter's statement that "[t]he valuations themselves are original cre-
ations" was "arguably dicta" unnecessary to the decision because the
defendant had copied the entire compilation.18 2 Distinguishing the
merger analysis of Maclean Hunter was a more difficult task.
As an earlier version of this manuscript predicted, 8s the court
distinguished the NYMEX evaluative process from the Maclean Hunter
NYMEX has avowed that its settlement prices are the "cornerstone of the
clearing process" and are the basis for calculating whether its customers
made or lost money on a particular day. Given this reality, it is simply not
credible for NYMEX to argue that its settlement prices reflect only one
expression (among many) of the sweeping idea that market values can be
derived from market transactions. To the contrary, as the district court cor-
rectly ruled, a NYMEX settlement price is the expression of a much more
specific idea ....
USG Brief, supra note 177, at 28-29. On the other hand, the USG Brief emphasizes
that some "judgment" going into a number does not undermine its basic factual
nature: "All measurement involves some amount of judgment and estimation" and
"NYMEX is therefore wrong to suggest that applying judgment to a measurement
destroys the factual nature of the result." Id. at 9-10.
179 N.Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., 497 F.3d 109,
116-18 (2d Cir. 2007).
180 Id. at 114.
181 Id. at 115 n.6 ("While NYMEX now argues that settlement prices are merely
opinions, we note that NYMEX itself treats the prices as news of the day.... NYMEX
also provides the prices to newspapers which publish them alongside other market
facts.").
182 Id. at 115 n.6 ("[I]n CCCa subscriber could not rely solely on the Red Book in
valuing any particular used car .... Similarly, CDN Inc. v. Kapes ... is distinguishable
because the prices for collectible coins in that case were estimates, not discovered
market facts." (citations omitted)).
183 Justin Hughes, The Flawed Ontology of Copyright Law 38 (July 27, 2007)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Notre Dame Law Review).
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evaluative process on the grounds that NYMEX attempts to establish/
reconstruct past facts while the prices in Maclean Hunter and Kapes
were judgments as to future events. 18 4 Of course, reconciling applica-
tion of the merger doctrine in Maclean Hunter, Kapes, and NYMEX in
this way required more or less treating the NYMEX settlement prices
as discovered facts-something the court said it was not deciding. 185
(Not to mention that this temporal distinction is grounded in a com-
mon sense worldview also challenged by modern physics and meta-
physics. 18 6) The court also appeared to distinguish application of
merger on the grounds that used car or collector coin values would
not apply directly to any particular used car or coin. In contrast, even
if the NYMEX settlement price was "created," once the settlement
price exists, it is the "fair market value for each NYMEX contract" and
"any dissension [from that number] would be exceptionally nar-
row."' 8 7 Of course, that is an unsatisfactory way to distinguish the
AYMEX ruling from Maclean Hunter;, dissension from the Red Book
used car values may also be "exceptionally narrow," particularly on
insurance compensation where the Red Book is mandated as the valua-
tion authority. Finally, the court distinguished Maclean Hunter from
the NYMEX case on policy grounds that have heretofore only
obliquely been stated in merger doctrine: whether or not the putative
copyright holder needed the incentive of copyright to produce the
work.18 8 We will return to that theme in Part VII.
V. LEGAL FACTS-WHEN PRIVATE PERSONS AUTHOR LAWS
Dating back to the 1834 Wheaton v. Peters'89 and 1888 Banks v.
Manchester'90 decisions, it has been black letter American copyright
doctrine that expressions of law cannot be copyrighted. One ratio-
nale is that the public "authors" the law, not particular judges or legis-
184 This is a theme in David Nimmer's exploration of the reconstruction of the
Dead Sea Scrolls. In a sense, the NYMEX numbers are like a conservator trying to
restore art, judging what was there. See generally Miles Unger, A Mysterious St. John,
Found in the Attic, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2007, § 2 (Arts & Leisure), at 31.
185 See N. Y. Mercantile Exch., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613.
186 See, e.g., MICHAEL LOCKWOOD, THE LABYRINTH OF TIME 10, 53, 64 (2005) (con-
trasting the "tensed conception" of reality against the "tenseless conception," in which
there is no significant difference between the past, present, and future).
187 NY. Mercantile Exch., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615.
188 After discussing the incentive function of copyright, particularly in respect of
Maclean Hunter, the court noted "NYMEX needs no such incentives here." Id.
189 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
190 128 U.S. 244 (1888).
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lators.1 91 Another is that the incentive of copyright is unneeded
because the expression of judges, as employees of the state, has
already been bought and paid for by the citizenry (a kind of public
work-for-hire doctrine, if you will). 19 2 A third reason is a pure due
process requirement of open access to the law: "The whole work done
by judges constitutes the authentic exposition and interpretation of
the law, which, binding every citizen, is free for publication to all."
1 93
But this bar to copyright in law has been attacked on the flanks in
cases concerning privately developed "model codes" that are adopted
into law. These model codes are usually the result of an intense,
quasi-private deliberative process by a professional body that then
claims copyright in the final expression of the model code. 1 94 At the
moment the code is completed (and not yet adopted as law), the copy-
right claim is as unremarkable as a movie studio claiming copyright in
a big budget picture on which hundreds of people worked. Only a
couple of courts have confronted the problems that begin when the
model code is adopted whole cloth as law. 195 In the most recent of
these controversies, the federal courts have finally recognized that
when a privately written code is adopted as law, the private expression
becomes "in one sense, a 'fact" 9 6 and that these "codes are 'facts'
under copyright law."1 97
A. BOCA v. Code Technology, Inc.
The First Circuit was the first to wade into this thicket in the 1980
Building Officials & Code Administrators v. Code Technology, Inc.198 deci-
sion. Building Officials and Code Administrators International, Inc.
(BOCA), a private group, had developed and published a model
191 As the majority noted in Wheaton, "It may be proper to remark that the court
are unanimously of opinion, that no reporter has or can have any copyright in the
written opinions delivered by this court; and that the judges thereof cannot confer on
any reporter any such right." Wheaton, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) at 668.
192 See, e.g., Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int'l, Inc. (Veeck I), 293 F.3d 791, 794
(5th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
193 Banks, 128 U.S. at 253.
194 See, e.g., Veeck II, 293 F.3d at 793-94 (describing Southern Building Code Con-
gress International's code promulgation and copyrighting).
195 See, e.g., id.; Bldg. Officials & Code Adm'rs v. Code Tech., Inc., 628 F.2d 730,
734-35 (1st Cir. 1980).
196 Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int'l, Inc. (Veeck 1), 241 F.3d 398, 408 n.49 (5th
Cir. 2001), rev'd en banc, 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002) ("The global enactment of a
code does make that code the law of the enacting municipality and hence, in one
sense, a 'fact.'") .
197 Veeck II, 293 F.3d at 801.
198 628 F.2d 730 (1st Cir. 1980).
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building code; it copyrighted the code and then "encourage[d],
through a licensing program, public authorities such as states to adopt
the BOCA Code."'199 After Massachusetts adopted the BOCA Code
with some minor modifications, 200 BOCA published it as the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts State Building Code;, it appears that there was no
official state publication of the state building code.20' When the
defendant, Code Technology (CT), sought to publish its own edition
of the Massachusetts Code, BOCA sued, and the trial court granted a
preliminary injunction.20 2
After reviewing the case law on copyright in law from Wheaton
and Banks forward, the First Circuit reversed the injunctive relief.203
The appellate panel concluded that it was "far from persuaded that
BOCA's virtual authorship of the Massachusetts building code entitles
it to enforce a copyright monopoly over when, where, and how the
[code] is to be reproduced and made publicly available," 20 4 but
"stop[ped] short . . .of ruling definitely on the underlying legal
issues." 205
B. Veeck v. Southern Building Code Congress
Twenty years later, the Fifth Circuit gave a much more thorough
treatment of this problem in Veeck v. Southern Building Code Congress
International, Inc. (Veeck 1),206 concluding that privately drafted codes
adopted as law had, indeed, become "facts."20 7 The nonprofit South-
ern Building Code Congress International (SBCCI) was formed in
1940 with its primary mission being to "develop, promote, and pro-
mulgate model building codes."20 Along with many other municipal-
ities, the Texas towns of Savoy and Anna had adopted versions of an
199 Id. at 732.
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Id. at 731.
203 Id. at 732-36.
204 Id. at 735.
205 Id. at 732. The First Circuit left open the possibility that BOCA could persuade
the trial court that its copyright in the model code should lead to damages. Id. at 736
("Since the rule denying copyright protection to judicial opinions and statutes grew
out of a much different set of circumstances than do these technical regulatory codes,
we think BOCA should at least be allowed to argue its position fully on the basis of an
evidentiary record, into which testimony and materials shedding light on the policy
issues discussed herein may be placed.").
206 241 F.3d 398 (5th Cir. 2001), rev'd en banc, 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002).
207 Id. at 408 n.49.
208 Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int'l, Inc. ( Veeck I), 293 F.3d 791, 793 (5th Cir.
2002) (en banc).
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SBCCI code as their own. 20 9 When Peter Veeck posted the town
building codes on his noncommercial website promoting north Texas,
SBCCI sued for copyright infringement.2 10
The trial court granted summary judgment on Veeck's infringe-
ment of the SBCCI copyright, a result the court of appeals initially
affirmed in Veeck /211 The Veeck Iappellate panel concluded (a) that
the incentive of copyright was needed to continue production of these
useful model codes; 2 12 (b) that there was no evidence that Veeck had
been denied access to the town building codes;21 3 and (c) that there
was no merger because "contrary to Veeck's insistence-there remain
many ways to write model building codes, not just one. '2 14 Each of
these conclusions, of course, echoes similar reasoning in Practice Man-
agement and/or Maclean Hunter.
Rehearing en banc produced a strong split among the Fifth Cir-
cuit judges with a majority finding both that the Wheaton/Banks rea-
soning required that Veeck have unfettered access to the law2 15 and
that "the codes are 'facts' under copyright law."'2 16 As to the first of
these two grounds, until Veeck II, due process/access claims in these
cases had been diffused through an understanding that the minimum
due process need is for people to know the laws, not for people to
republish the laws. For example, the Practice Management panel focused
on the access side of a work being "available":
There is no evidence that anyone wishing to use the CPT has any
difficulty obtaining access to it. Practice Management is not a
potential user denied access to the CPT, but a putative copier wish-
ing to share in the AMA's statutory monopoly. Practice Manage-
209 Veeck I, 241 F.3d at 401.
210 Id.
211 Id. at 402, 411.
212 Id. at 402-03.
213 Id. at 403-04 n.17 (noting that "had Veeck in fact been unable to obtain a copy
of the enacted building codes because of SBCCI's copyright, we would likely conclude
that due process provides grounds to invalidate such copyright").
214 Id. at 407.
215 Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int'l, Inc. (Veeck I), 293 F.3d 791, 799-800 (5th
Cir. 2002) (en banc). The majority disagreed that Wheaton and Banks embodied the
pecuniary/incentives argument that judges "do not need the 'incentives' that copy-
right affords in order to write opinions." Id. at 797. Instead the majority viewed the
Banks holding as based on a "'metaphorical concept of citizen authorship"' together
with the need for citizens to have free access to the laws. Id. at 799 (quoting Bldg.
Officials & Code Adm'rs v. Code Tech., Inc., 628 F.2d 730, 734 (1st Cir. 1980)).
216 Id. at 801.
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ment does not assert the AMA has restricted access to users or
intends to do so in the future.
21 7
Thus, the Practice Management court addressed the access issue and did
not opine on the other half of Banks-that the law be "free for publi-
cation to all."
2 1 8
Of course, the ability of third parties to republish a code can be
linked with increased general access, but not all of the situations in
these disputes lend themselves to that kind of analysis. Practice Man-
agement had, until the dispute, been reselling AMA-produced copies
of the CPT, so it was not obvious that Practice Management republish-
ing the CPT was going to trigger any meaningful increase in access.
2 19
In BOCA, the plaintiff sold copies of its Commonwealth of Massachusetts
State Building Code (3d ed.) for twenty-two dollars each while the defen-
dant was selling an edition that included the state code and other
materials for thirty-five dollars-hardly an increase in accessibility.
2 20
It is only in the internet-based cases-Maclean Hunter and Veeck-that
"free for publication" obviously increases access.
The second ground for the Veeck II holding was a clear endorse-
ment of the thesis here. In ruling that "the codes are 'facts' under
copyright law," the en banc majority reasoned, "It should be obvious
that for copyright purposes, laws are 'facts': the U.S. Constitution is a
fact; the Federal Tax Code and its regulations are facts; the Texas Uni-
form Commercial Code is a fact."2 2 1 In the courtroom, we may func-
tionally distinguish law and facts, but otherwise what the court says
217 Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 121 F.3d 516, 519 (9th Cir.
1997), amended by 133 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 1998). The court added that the AMA "has
no incentive to limit or forgo publication" and that the federal government had
ample remedies if the AMA did, including "terminat[ing] its agreement with AMA."
Id.
218 Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 253 (1888). The Practice Management court
cited similar reasoning from the Fifth Circuit. In Texas v. West Publishing Co., 882 F.2d
171 (5th Cir. 1989), the court turned back Texas' argument against West's claim of
copyright over its own arrangement of Texas laws. Id. at 175-76. After finding that
Texans had access to Texas' arrangement of its own state statutes, the court reasoned
that, as to West's "Vernon's Annotated Texas Statutes," there was "no evidence that
anyone is being denied access to Vernon's or that West intends to deny access in the
future. Accordingly, Texas residents are not being deprived of any due process right
they could conceivably have to access Texas laws." Id. at 177.
219 Practice Mgmt., 121 F.3d at 518.
220 BOCA, 628 F.2d at 732.
221 Veeck II, 293 F.3d at 801. This gave a ringing endorsement to Judge Little's
dissent in Veeck L Judge Little had recognized that "there is merit to Veeck's argu-
ment that once enacted, the codes do become a fact or idea, in that there is only one
accurate way to express an enacted law .... By its very nature, an enacted law enters
the public realm as a concrete, definite fact/idea." Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int'l,
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here comports with our intuitions. Most of us would say that income
tax returns being due on April 15 is a fact; the speed limit on the
highway you take to work is a fact; that parents are responsible for the
torts of their minor children is a fact. If all of these are facts-and
become so as a matter of statutes on the law books-how can these
official building codes not be treated as massive compilations of fact a
la Feist?
With this result, the majority reasonably felt compelled to distin-
guish the building codes which had "become law" from things "the
law requires citizens to consult . . . in the process of fulfilling their
obligations," like the Red Book valuations or CPT medical codes.222
This is the same distinction that Lawrence Cunningham draws
between "strong" (or "semi-strong") and "soft" adoption into the
law22 3-and the reason I do not consider evaluation cases like Practice
Management to be true "legal fact" situations. But the en banc dissent
rightly criticized this line drawing and, as I will argue in the next Part,
it is a distinction without much difference: the legal codes, the CPT,
and the Red Book car valuations are all social facts in the Searlean
sense.224 The groupings here (of naming, evaluative, and legal facts)
have been for convenience; the key issue is status as a social fact. The
argument then becomes that a law is a (social) fact that can be
expressed in only one or a very limited number of ways, producing
merger of expressive work and fact.225
While the due process argument can be limited as the courts in
Practice Management and Veeck I limited it (access means "access" and
use, not reproduction), the traditional merger doctrine cannot be so
limited. If there is merger of expression and fact, the copyright disap-
pears, raising a colorable claim that the government decision to inte-
grate or reference the privately created work produces a compensable
"taking."226 Part VI aims to convince the reader that this radical con-
Inc. ( Veeck 1), 241 F.3d 398, 415 (5th Cir. 2001) (Little, J., dissenting), rev'd en banc,
293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002).
222 Veeck II, 293 F.3d at 804-05.
223 See Cunningham, supra note 4, at 293.
224 See infra Part VI.
225 Veeck 1, 241 F.3d at 407. As the Veeck I panel feared, "the adoption of SBCCI's
code into law was a transformative event that instantly denuded the work of copyright
protection." Id.
226 Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 121 F.3d 516, 520 (9th Cir.
1997) (quoting CCC Info. Serv., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d
61, 74 (2d Cir. 1994)), amended by 133 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 1998). The government
would have to compensate the private party for the full value of the copyright, an
ironic twist for sure, since governments adopt such privately created works to save
costs. See Revision of 0MB Circular No. A-119, Notice of Implementation, 58 Fed.
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clusion is warranted in the sense that these are facts; Part VII aims to
convince the reader that this radical conclusion can be avoided by
judicious recalibration of the merger doctrine to take account of situa-
tions in which creation of the expression entails creation of the facts.
VI. BUT ARE THESE "FACTS"? AND, IF So, WHAT HAPPENS?
In Maclean Hunter, Judge Leval announced a new distinction
between "building-block" and opinion "infused" ideas, shielding
expressions of the latter from copyright's merger doctrine. 227 In a
1999 speech, Judge Jon Newman offered the same distinction but
inadvertently admitted that this device allows copyright to protect
ideas:
[F]or copyright purposes, simply labeling an aggregation of facts as
an idea does not help decide whether a particular aggregation is
protectable. All ideas are not created equal. The unprotectable cat-
egory includes those that undertake to advance the understanding
of phenomena or the solution of problems, while the protectable
category includes those that reflect the author's taste and
opinion. 228
To use Judge Leval's language, the problem with each Red Book car
valuation is that it is both an opinion-infused idea and a necessary
building block for lots of further human activity. To use Judge New-
man's distinction, car valuations both "reflect the author's . . . opin-
ion" and are "undertake[n] to advance . . . the solution of
problems. '229 Used coin prices, restaurant ratings, medical procedure
designations, settlement prices, and privately drafted model laws may
be (initially) very much matters of opinion, but opinions systemati-
cally undertaken/formulated to solve problems.
Of course, that does not mean that these designations, evalua-
tions, and privately drafted laws are facts in our copyright doctrine, let
alone in our metaphysics. But anyone who wants to deny "factness" to
designations, evaluations, and privately drafted laws has to reconsider
all types of facts established through social institutions. Just as we may
Reg. 57,643, 57,644-45 (Oct. 26, 1993) (directing federal agencies to adopt private
standards "whenever practicable" to "eliminate[ ] the costs to the Government of
developing its own standards"). See generally Thomas F. Cotter, Do Federal Uses of Intel-
lectual Property Implicate the Fifth Amendment?, 50 FiA. L. REv. 529, 558-65 (1998) (illus-
trating the difficulty of defining what constitutes a "taking" in merging expression and
fact in intellectual property law).
227 Maclean Hunter, 44 F.3d at 72-73.
228 Jon 0. Newman, New Lyrics for an Old Melody: The Idea/Expression Dichotomy in the
Computer Age, 17 CARDozo ARTS & ENr. L.J. 691, 698 (1999) (footnote omitted).
229 Id.
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question whether a 2005 Chevy Malibu is really worth $10,250 or a
"Henry Hub natural gas futures contract is worth $25, ' 230 we can
ask-in the same philosophical tone of voice-the same question
about any social fact. John Searle raises just the same objection to all
social facts as we might make to a state's bond rating or a used car
valuation:
Our sense that there is an element of magic, a conjuring trick,
a sleight of hand in the creation of institutional facts out of brute
facts derives from the nonphysical, noncausal character of the rela-
tion of the X and Y terms .... In our toughest metaphysical moods,
we want to ask "But is an X really a Y?" For example, are these bits
of paper really money? . . . Is making certain noises at a ceremony
really getting married? ... Surely when you get down to brass tacks,
these are not real facts.
2 31
Searle's answer is that a social fact arises when (a) someone declares
or states that such and such is the case, and (b) it becomes widely
accepted that such and such is the case. 232 That green, rectangular
piece of paper is twenty dollars because the U.S. Treasury declares it
to be 233 and we all accept that.2 34
Similarly, a designation-whether an airplane type ("787") or a
person ("Rock Hudson"2 5 )-is only treated as a fact when it is widely
accepted by the relevant community. The same is true with credit rat-
ings23 6 and other numeric evaluations. In the Kapes case, CDN was
alleged to have promoted its wholesale coin prices as facts2 7-a
charge also leveled against NYMEX. 23 8 And if those used coin values
were widely accepted, CDN was right to do so. Widespread accept-
230 N.Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., 497 F.3d 109,
117 (2d Cir. 2007).
231 SEARLE, supra note 37, at 45.
232 Id. at 45-46.
233 As Searle observes, "When the Treasury says [this piece of paper] is legal
tender, they are declaring it to be legal tender, not announcing an empirical fact that
it already is legal tender." Id. at 55.
234 See id. at 112 ("We have nothing but the ability to impose a status, and with it a
function, by collective agreement or acceptance.").
235 Born Roy Scherer. See KEITH BOYKIN, BEYOND THE DOWN LOW 71 (2006).
236 For example, there has never been any doubt that credit ratings are "customer
information of a financial institution" under 15 U.S.C. § 6827(2) (2000), defined as
"any information maintained by or for a financial institution which is derived from
the relationship between the financial institution and a customer of the financial insti-
tution and is identified with the customer," id.
237 CDN Inc. v. Kapes, 197 F.3d 1256, 1262 (9th Cir. 1999).
238 N.Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., 497 F.3d 109,
115 n.6 (2d Cir. 2007).
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ance may take time; but social facts can also arise abruptly. Indeed,
the example Searle gives of social facts arising abruptly is "where legis-
lation is passed or the authorities change the rules of the game"23 9-
just as the Veeck en banc majority understood.240 But even in those
cases there must be acceptance (or at least not general, active rejec-
tion) by the society. 241
A. Fact or Fiction?
One might ask how all this relates to the "facts" created by works
of literature. Indeed, the only American court to use the phrase "cre-
ated facts" did so in relation to "facts" within a fictional storyline, 242
and it is fair to say that well-known literary or artistic narratives estab-
lish widely known, socially accepted details, e.g., that Ahab lost a leg to
the white whale; 243 that ground control lost contact with Major
Tom; 2 4 4 that Bruce Wayne is Batman 245-as surely as Peter Parker is
239 SEARLE, supra note 37, at 125.
240 Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int'l, Inc. ( Veeck II), 293 F.3d 791, 799 (5th Cir.
2002) (en banc).
241 Simon Blackburn also observes this point when he writes of facts arising from
law: "In the case of human law," it "ought to be the command of a properly consti-
tuted authority-but then, what kind of fact is it that some group of people makes up
such an authority?" BLACKBURN, supra note 18, at 110-11. Of course, a statement
becomes law-and a fact-through a "performative" speech utterance. See generally
J.L. AUSTIN, How To Do THINGS WITH WoRDs 53-66 (J.O. Urmson & Marina Sbisa
eds., 2d ed. 1975) (distinguishing the performative from the constative utterance);
SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS, supra note 74, at 37-39 (discussing "performative" verbs); Justin
Hughes, Group Speech Acts, 7 LINGUISTICS & PHIL. 379, 380 (1984) (describing court
decisions as speech acts from groups). If the "performative" is accepted-that Jane
and Peter are now married, that Charles is now coronated King, etc.-then it is "felici-
tious"; only then does it become a social fact. And as Derrida noted, "There are cases
in which it is not known for generations if the performative of the violent founding of
a state is 'felicitous' or not." Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation of
Authority, " 11 CARDozo L. REV. 919, 993 (Mary Quaintance trans., 1990).
242 See Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 139 (2d
Cir. 1998) (recognizing that the "original, protected expression" at issue-character
and event details from the television series Seinfeld-were "created facts"). Scholars
who have used the phrase "created facts" are few too, but include Karjala, supra note
5, at 477.
243 HERMAN MELVILLE, MoBy DICK (Arion Press 1979) (1851).
244 DAVID BOWIE, Space Oddity, on SPACE ODDITY (Philips 1969).
245 One could cite literally thousands of sources for this, but although Bob Kane
created Batman in 1939, see MARK S. REINHART, THE BATMAN FILMOGRAPHY 5 (2005),
my favorite is FRANK MILLER ET AL., THE DARK KNIGHT RETURNS (10th anniversary ed.
1996).
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Spiderman;246 that Marge is married to Homer 247-as surely as Wilma
is married to Fred. 248 To consider the widely known, socially accepted
nature of these details conduct a thought experiment: if there had
been no footnotes in this paragraph, would you have known these
things to be "true?" And yet, asJeanette Winterson says, "The truth of
fiction is not the truth of railway tables."249
I have repeatedly said that the created fact cases above generate
designations, evaluations, and propositions that are necessary for fur-
ther activity, expressive and nonexpressive. It is tempting to say that
this distinguishes them from facts in a fictional storyline because ele-
ments of fiction are rarely needed for nonexpressive activity. You might
need Star Trek for your "Slash" stories-this is the whole "recoding"
debate in copyright scholarship 25 0-but you do not need any details
from Faulkner or Star Wars to sell your used car, get reimbursed for
medical services rendered, or engage in construction as a line of work.
Not only do people rely upon authored designations, evaluations, and
laws for subsequent nonexpressive activity, but we normatively accept
and expect such reliance across the board; we believe that such reli-
246 Spider-Man first appeared in 15 AMAZING FANTASY (Aug. 1962), see EDWARD
GROSS, SPIDER-MAN CONFIDENTIAL 8 (2002), and is the subject of three blockbuster
films creatively titled, SPIDER-MAN (Columbia Pictures 2002), SPIDER-MAN 2 (Columbia
Pictures 2004), and SPIDER-MAN 3 (Columbia Pictures 2007).
247 See, e.g., CHRIS TURNER, PLANET SIMPSON 77 (2004).
248 The Flintstones (ABC television broadcast 1960-66). Although there were only
166 episodes in the original cartoon series, see Internet Movie Database, The Flint-
stones, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0053502 (last visited Oct. 22, 2007), it has
enjoyed wildly successful and continuous syndication-plus network specials, spin-off
series like The Pebbles and Bamm-Bamm Show (Hanna-Barbera Productions television
broadcast 1971-76), and two feature films starringJohn Goodman and, in one film or
the other, a bunch of actors who should have known better (including Rosie
O'Donnell, Kyle MacLachlan, Halle Berry, Elizabeth Taylor, Stephen Baldwin, Joan
Collins, and Alan Cumming), see, e.g., THE FLINTSTONES IN VIVA ROCK VEGAS (Univer-
sal Pictures & Amblin Entertainment 2000).
249 JEANETTE WINTERSON, ART OBJECTS 54 (1995).
250 See, e.g., Keith Aoki, Adrift in the Intertext: Authorship and Audience "Recoding"
Rights-Comment on Robert H. Rotstein, "Beyond Metaphor: Copyright Infringement and the
Fiction of the Work, "68 C--KENT L. REV. 805, 811-16 (1993);James Boyle, A Theory of
Law and Information: Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail and Insider Trading, 80 CAL. L. REV.
1413, 1426-27 (1992); Rosemary J. Coombe, Author/izing the Celebrity: Publicity Rights,
Postmodern Politics, and Unauthorized Genders, 10 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 365, 387
(1992); Justin Hughes, "Recoding" Intellectual Property and Overlooked Audiences, 77 TEX.
L. REv. 923, 926 (1999); Peter Jaszi, On the Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright and
Collective Creativity, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 293, 294 (1992);Jessica Litman, The
Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 1007 (1990); Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions: Copy-




ance is (nearly?) always useful. In contrast, undue reliance on details
from popular film and television to manifest the expressive activities
of one's life is often considered suboptimal: Radin might say this is
not "human flourishing";251 William Shatner might tell Trekkies to
"get a life."2 52 For good reason, we might not want to treat these
details of literature as facts. 25 3
Of course, even if utility can distinguish the created facts in desig-
nations, evaluations, model laws, etc. from the details created in litera-
ture and the arts, utility should not be an indicator of "factness" or
truth-status. As Simon Blackburn notes, "Truth has rights and privi-
leges of its own, and they are not just the same as utility";2 5 4 indeed,
when it comes to utility, "in many circumstances an adaptive illusion
will do just as well as truth. 255
For one who adheres to the correspondence theory of truth, the
difference between these created fact cases and "fictional facts" is, in
some sense, where the fact is "located." If someone says, "Is Marge
really the wife of Homer?" we are likely to disabuse them of the notion
that Marge and Homer are real, living people with something like,
"Marge is really the wife of Homer on The Simpsons show."256 In con-
trast, the CPT codes, the Red Book valuations, and the building code of
Savoy, Texas, take on a life outside the expressive work where they
first appear. Fictional facts can be inconsistent-they do not have to
"cohere" because they are understood to be located within and only
within the expressive work. 257
251 SeeMARGARETJANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 79-102 (1996) (discussing
market rhetoric and its effect on "human flourishing").
252 WILLIAM SHATNER WITH CHRIS KRESKI, GET A LIFE! (1999). The title comes, as
Amazon.com says, from Shatner "[p]oking fun at Star Trek's gung-ho fans and conven-
tions in a now infamous Saturday Night Live sketch." Amazon.com, Book Review of Get
a Lifet!, http://www.amazon.com/Life-Star-Trek-William-Shatner/dp/0671021311
(last visited Oct. 22, 2007).
253 My thanks to David McGowan for this observation.
254 BLACKBURN, supra note 18, at 9.
255 Id. at 105 (discussing Nietzsche).
256 Although, as one scholar notes, "[fMans seemingly blur the boundaries between
fact and fiction, speaking of characters as if they had an existence apart from their
textual manifestations." HENRYJENKINS, TEXTUAL POACHERS 18 (1992).
257 As Blackburn writes about believing something to be true:
A belief is given its identity by what it excludes.
A fiction is not. We can happily read one story about a fictional charac-
ter, and then a different story, without finding it necessary to reconcile
them. True, aficionados can get very shirty if in one story it is said that the
hero has fair hair and in the next story he is said to have black hair, but that
is because they are trying to join the two stories together, which they don't
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B. Facts, Utility, and Processes
In keeping with what I have just said, it is tempting to focus on
the functional aspect or "essentiality" of created facts. As with many
other social facts, in a created fact situation the expression becomes
important, if not essential, to functional, nonexpressive activities in
the society.258 Just as that rectangular green paper being a twenty dol-
lar bill has functional implications, credit ratings, economic valua-
tions, estimates of material strength, and designations (particularly
those in classificatory taxonomies) are all used by people to do
things-purchase cars, trade baseball cards, build buildings, decide
where to eat, order the right size and kind of parts, etc. Private
expression integrated into the law is the most straightforward example
of expressions becoming essential to functional activities. If the law is
precise-that the walls of two-storied wood frame buildings must have
two-inch by four-inch studs that are centered at sixteen inches or
closer-then access to the expression is necessary for nonexpressive
activity (construction).
But the analysis here is quite different from Lawrence Cunning-
ham's analysis of these cases as private expression being integrated
into public law. 2 5 9 The argument here focuses on expression becoming
fact-of which expression becoming law (Cunningham's concern) is just
have to do. Whereas if the stories were histories of one actual man, they
would have to be reconciled.
BLAcKBuRN, supra note 18, at 192.
258 Defining what is "functional" or "utilitarian" has plagued jurists-as well as
scholars-for some time. For example, in Computer Associates International, Inc. v.
Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992), in trying to identify the "functional," Judge
Walker compared the Humpty Dumpty story to a recipe for scrambled eggs by saying
the latter is "a more process oriented text." Id. at 704. A recipe, of course, is aimed at
a nonexpressive human activity.
259 Professor Cunningham distinguishes between "weak," "semi-strong," and
"strong" adoption of private expression into public law. Cunningham, supra note 4,
at 293. His paradigmatic examples are "ex ante government designation of the stan-
dard setter as an officially recognized body (strong form)," id.; standards "incorpo-
rate[ed] into law after creation" by a private entity (semi-strong form), id.; and
adoption through "passing reference in legal materials (weak form)," id. He posits
that access to the expression is most needed in cases of "strong" adoption, less with
"semi-strong," and even less with "weak." Id. I do not find that this tripartite division
adequately captures the important differences and similarities among the ways private
expression is adopted into law. For example, he says that with "strong form" adoption
the "distinguishing feature" is that the privately generated expressions "constitute the
fabric of that law," id. at 299, but that is apparently true of the semi-strong too. Cun-
ningham posits an inverse relationship between how much people need access to
these codes and how much copyright incentive is needed to produce, i.e., the more
access is needed, the less copyright incentive is needed. Id. at 299-300. This might
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one form. Indeed, in Practice Management, Delta Dental, Maclean
Hunter, and Veeck the private expression was adopted (one way or
another) into law because it was already widely agreed upon as the
standard. Governments adopt existing, privately created standards
not just to avoid (the cost of) reinventing the wheel: they adopt
existing, privately created standards because those standards have
legitimacy and social reference already. A cardiopulmonary resuscita-
tion had already become a 92950 by the time Medicaid adopted the
AMA taxonomy; the value of your ten-year-old, driven-only-on-Sundays
sedan had already become whatever value the Red Book said it was
when the values were adopted by reference into state insurance laws.
The ADA code designations, the CDN coin valuations, and the
Southco parts numbers were all social standards-and created facts-
without needing to be integrated into law. Peter Menell has explored
how courts from the mid-1980s forward have declined to find copy-
right protection (often on the grounds of merger) in cases where sim-
ilarity in computer programs has been dictated (a) by standard
practices in the industry for which the software programs are
designed, 260 (b) by methods or practices that a large population has
come to rely upon for daily activities, 26 1 and (c) by the need to oper-
ate on common hardware or with common software. 262 The function-
ality of such computer programs, communications protocols, and
software interfaces is usually-and profitably-analyzed in terms of
the § 102(b) bar on processes and methods of operation.2 63
be generally right, but this appears to be an empirical question that deserves careful
attention.
260 See Plains Cotton Coop. Ass'n v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., Inc., 807 F.2d
1256, 1260-61 (5th Cir. 1987) (denying plaintiffs request for a preliminary injunc-
tion in a copyright suit in light of evidence showing that software was created based
on personal skills and knowledge of the industry).
261 See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 815 (1st Cir. 1995)
(finding that a computer command hierarchy was an unprotectable method of opera-
tion); Peter Menell, An Epitaph for Traditional Copyright Protection of Network Features of
Computer Software, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 651, 684-703 (1998).
262 See Batesman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1542 (11th Cir. 1996)
("[E]xternal considerations such as compatibility may negate a finding of infringe-
ment."); Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 714-15 (2d Cir.
1992) (holding that functional elements are not protected). See generally Peter
Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application Programs, 41 STAN.
L. Rrv. 1045, 1101-03 (1989) (arguing that a careful application of the merger doc-
trine can create incentives for the development of better computer application pro-
grams); Peter Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, 39 STAN. L. REv.
1329, 1353-71 (1987) (analyzing the economic effects of using copyright doctrine to
provide legal protection for computer software).
263 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
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Social facts are like standardized industry practices, particularly as
to a social fact's existence being conditioned on widespread accept-
ance in the society or relevant portion of the society. It is easy to see
that some protocols-like the generally accepted accounting princi-
ples (GAAP) become both social facts and "methods of operation": it
becomes impossible to do the process (accounting) without the
expression. This is true as long as schools teach GAAP, businesses use
GAAP, and markets expect businesses to use GAAP-GAAP is then
integral to the process of accounting regardless of the integration of
GAAP into law. It is not as obvious how a used car valuation or a parts
designation can be an uncopyrightable "process," but there is some
parallelism: once it is widely accepted, a designation (like "787" or
"Rock Hudson") is a social convention-a communication standard,
so to speak. Like technical or industry standards, it becomes the only
reasonable way to do something-in this case, the only reasonable way
to refer to X is using Xs name. 264 So it might be possible to subsume
the recognition of created facts into recognition of expressions which
become communication "protocols" that are necessary for nonexpres-
sive activity.
Nonetheless, as long as we subscribe to facts and a correspon-
dence theory of truth (in the way our legal system generally does), the
designation and evaluation cases discussed above feel like something
more than communication protocols. In these cases, original expres-
sion becomes the basis for universally accepted propositions of the
form "this is X," "that is Y," "A is B" that seem to have truth values.
These are social facts generated directly from what copyright calls
"original expression" and from what copyright calls "authors." That is
the created facts problem-and the gaping hole in the Feistian
scheme of things.
The problem is that an honest assessment that these evaluations,
judgments, and designations produce social facts can lead to blunt
application of the merger doctrine-and, thereby, eliminate any pos-
264 It is for this reason that "nominative uses" of words and short phrases are
shielded from liability under Lanham Act analysis. See New Kids on the Block v. News
Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992) ("[N]ominative use of a mark-
where the only word reasonably available to describe a particular thing is pressed into
service-lies outside the strictures of trademark law." (emphasis omitted)); Chambers
v. Time-Warner, Inc., 123 F. Supp. 2d 198, 202 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (dismissing, on sum-
mary judgment, a Lanham Act claim for use of musicians' names to identify musi-
cians' works in online service because "the above-described [use] is simply a
permissible 'nominative use,' i.e., a fair use of the artist's name as a necessary means of
accurately identifying the inventory in question offered by MP3.com") (second emphasis
added), vacated, 282 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2002).
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sible copyright incentive. To understand this, we have to recognize
that the merger doctrine works differently with what we call "ideas"
and what we call "facts."
The merger doctrine is notoriously malleable. With ideas, the
doctrine's indeterminacy comes from trying to apply an either/or
dichotomy-with draconian implications-to a multilayered world.
Resting on top of any given expression, there is, metaphorically, a
stack of increasingly abstract ideas.265 At the bottom of the stack,
there may be a least abstract, most precise idea expressible only in the
words chosen-if that's the "idea" in merger doctrine, there would be
no copyright.266 At the other end, one can always find an idea so
abstract that there is definitely no merger. For example, the original
brain-in-a-vat science fiction story, "Donovan's Brain,"267 became,
according to its author, "the acknowledged basis for three movies, as
well as perhaps 50 more that appropriated the basic idea."2 68 Distin-
guishing between the three films and the fifty films makes sense to us
because we know that the reference to a "basic idea" is a reference to a
highly abstracted, very general idea. It is the same notion that Judge
Hand presented in saying that a filmmaker would not infringe a stage
play if he used "only the more general patterns" of the play.269
But notions of the "basic idea" or the "general pattern" are not
useful when it comes to facts and expressions of facts. We would not
say that the expression of a specific temperature reading in Chicago at
265 This vertical metaphor of ideas on top of expressions should be intuitive for
most people thinking about this issue, i.e., in Sid & Marty Kroffi Television Productions,
Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977), the court describes liability as
occurring only when the defendant's own expression of ideas shared with the plain-
tiff's work "descends so far into what is concrete in a work as to invade its expression,"
id. at 1163 (emphasis added), a description which has appealed to other courts, see
Hartman v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 639 F. Supp. 816, 819 (W.D. Mo. 1986); Perma
Greetings, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 598 F. Supp. 445, 447 (E.D. Mo. 1984). And, of
course, the discussion of "levels" of abstraction related to an expression also implies
this vertical metaphor. See, e.g., Feder v. Videotrip Corp., 697 F. Supp. 1165, 1173 (D.
Colo. 1988). On other occasions, courts have employed the vertical metaphor in the
other direction, finding the idea underneath the expression. See, e.g., Cont'l Cas. Co. v.
Beardsley, 253 F.2d 702, 706 (2d Cir. 1958) (discussing the need for "free use of the
thought beneath the [copyrighted] language" and the "use of the underlying idea")
(emphasis added).
266 Cf John Shephard Wiley Jr., Copyright at the School of Patent, 58 U. CHI. L. REv.
119, 123 (1991) (suggesting that if copyright law protected only the literal expression
of an idea, then every admitted copier would have a defense).
267 See Douglas Martin, Curt Siodmak Dies at 98; Created Modern "Wolf Man, " N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 19, 2000, § 1, at 56.
268 Id.
269 Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936).
2007]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
noon on May 4, 2007 (say, "sixty-three degrees Fahrenheit") is protect-
able because, after all, it does not propertize the basic idea of a temper-
ature in Chicago at noon on May 4, 2007 (or of a temperature in
Chicago, more generally). There is something irrelevant about this
kind of reasoning: we are not concerned about more abstract levels
when it comes to facts. An abstract fact is a classification, a theory, a
law of nature, i.e., that there will be a temperature in Chicago on May 4,
2007. This is what is so dissatisfying about Judge Leval's comment in
Maclean Hunter that the plaintiff's "ideas" were general ideas of used
car valuations27 0-and why the same argument did not fly in NYMEX.
What matters to us are the precise valuations. 271 Those precise valua-
tions are social facts; the social facts and the expression of those facts
are merged.
In many cases-as in Feist-drawing a distinction between facts
and expression of facts is an extra, pointless step. Facts are always
unprotected and, at least in databases, there is almost always merger
between them and their expressions. That is what produces the bind
with created facts. After Feist, if a court recognizes that the expres-
sions in a nonfictional database are as much expression of facts as the
phone numbers in Feist, the merger doctrine proceeds swiftly and
surely to denude the work of any copyright protection beyond selec-
tion and arrangement. 272
VII. PRESERVING INCENTIVES WHEN INCENTIVES ARE NEEDED
As postindustrial economic development proceeds, valuable
nonfictional databases filled with evaluations, judgments, and designa-
tions (and business models based on these databases) will only prolif-
erate. As will the likely disputes about who controls the contents and
how. If being honest about "facts" means the merger doctrine will
knock out copyright protection for many of these works, is that a
problem? Arguably yes, for a discrete subset of these information
products. For such products, we will need to find ways to curb and/or
probably recalibrate the merger doctrine. To that end, let's consider
what kinds of "created fact works" may need the incentive of copyright
and what limiting doctrines of copyright can be brought to bear in
270 CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 71 (2d
Cir. 1994).
271 And, similarly, this is what seems so irrelevant about the Veeck I court telling us
that "there are at least two other sets of building codes that currently compete with
SBCCI's." Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int'l, Inc. (Veeck 1), 241 F.3d 398, 407 (5th
Cir. 2001), rev'd en banc, 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002).
272 See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991).
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balancing the need to have incentives for the expression with the
need to have access to the facts created by the expression.
A. Determining Where Incentives Are Needed
In considering whether the copyright incentive is needed, we
must recognize that many facts will be "created" by people for
noneconomic incentives, such as a sense of civic or professional duty.
Within the economic realm, we should also distinguish between eco-
nomic incentives dependent on copyright and other economic incen-
tives. Without delving into the minefield about whether such
determinations should affect copyright protection more broadly
(there are lots of reasons to think they shouldn't), let us consider
these issues in relation to the eight cases discussed above.
The most obvious of the cases are Southco and NYMEX. For-profit
Southco had a strong business incentive to give designations to its
parts-indeed, it could not carry on a parts-selling business without
doing so. No copyright protection is needed for that economic incen-
tive to remain stable. The NYMEX litigation also seems a simple case
because (a) preparation of the settlement prices is mandatory for
NYMEX to carry on its business and (b) disclosure of the prices is
legally required-by the Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion 273-for NYMEX to be in that business. 274 In contrast, Maclean
Hunter seems at the other extreme: the copyright owner's for-profit
business was producing and selling the expression, not to mention
that substantial numbers of its customers were migrating to the
cheaper service that the defendant was able to offer by freely copying
Maclean Hunter's expressions. 275 This persuasive distinction clearly
animated the Second Circuit's decision in NYMEX: after recognizing
the fear thirteen years earlier that without copyright Maclean Hunter
"'might direct their energies elsewhere, depriving the public of their
creations,"' the court concluded that "NYMEX needs no such
incentives."276
The rest of the cases seem to fall somewhere between these two,
potentially pointing to the need to make careful determinations
whether the copyright incentive is needed in situations involving "cre-
273 See 17 C.F.R. § 16.01 (2007).
274 See N.Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., 497 F.3d 109,
110 (2d Cir. 2007).
275 CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 64 (2d
Cir. 1994).
276 N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 497 F.3d at 118 (quoting Maclean Hunter, 44 F.3d at 66
(2d Cir. 1994)).
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ated fact" works. In Practice Management and Delta Dental, the courts
expressly concluded that the copyright holder needed the incentive of
copyright,2 77 but the status of each as a nonprofit, professional associ-
ation raises the legitimate issue of whether that was really true. The
nonprofit status hardly settles the issue-nonprofit organizations can
certainly depend on publication sales for their operations; 278 in Veeck
this precise point was contested among the various opinions.279 The
status of the group as a professional association-intent on rendering
beneficial services to the profession-seems a stronger argument for
why the copyright incentive is not needed. Further along this spec-
trum, the case against copyright incentive being genuinely needed
seems even stronger when the "author" is a professional association
intent on getting its expression enacted into law (as in BOCA); at that
point, professional prestige and public service seem to be the driving
forces. This was an important argument for the Veeck II majority. 280
In these types of cases, perhaps district courts need to do a more
thorough job developing evidence of the copyright holder's business
model-presumably they would do so if they knew that the way in
which they were to apply the merger doctrine turned on whether cop-
yright was needed to bring the expression (and, hence, the facts) into
existence.
B. Fair Uses, Implying Licenses, and Recalibrating the Merger Doctrine
If there remains a kernel of situations where the copyright incen-
tive seems quite important for production of the expression and,
therefore, the facts, what are we to make of copyright's limiting princi-
ples in such situations? Before turning to the merger doctrine-and
277 See Am. Dental Ass'n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass'n, 126 F.3d 977, 981 (7th Cir.
1997); Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 121 F.3d 516, 518-19 (9th Cir.
1997), amended by 133 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 1998).
278 The finances are often hard to figure out. For example, roughly eighteen per-
cent of the revenues of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA) come from sales of accounting standards. Am. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB.
AcCOUNTANTS, 2002-2003 ANNUAL REPORT 17 (2003). But Professor Cunningham
discusses how the AICPA sales operation sustained deficits in the early 2000s. Cun-
ningham, supra note 4, at 320.
279 In Veeck II, the majority characterized the evidence that copyright revenues
were needed as "self-serving affidavits from [SBCCI] officers and employees and proof
that it earns perhaps 40% of its revenue" from selling copies of its model codes.
Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int'l, Inc. (Veeck I1), 293 F.3d 791, 805 n.21 (5th Cir.
2002) (en banc).
280 See id. at 805; see also Cunningham, supra note 4, at 304 (analyzing the Veeck H




how it sweeps too broadly in Maclean Hunter-type situations-let us
consider what happens with fair use and the doctrine of implied
licenses when we understand these works as "factual works."
1. Fair Use and Implied Licenses for Created Fact Works
Concluding that a copyrighted work is principally a (created) fac-
tual work affects the fair use analysis because "[t] he scope of fair use is
greater with respect to factual than non-factual works. '28 1 Mechani-
cally, a determination that a plaintiff's work is a created fact work
would impact the fair use analysis principally through the second fac-
tor.28 2 In Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises,28 3 the Court told us that
this factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, recognizes "a greater
need to disseminate factual works than works of fiction or fantasy."284
The Court quoted Professor Gorman approvingly for the notion that
"' [t] he extent to which one must permit expressive language to be
copied, in order to assure dissemination of the underlying facts, will
thus vary from case to case."' 28 5 With created fact works of the sort
considered in this Article, the expression is probably the only way to
"assure dissemination of the underlying facts. '28 6 Thus, one could
argue that the fair use doctrine, by itself, would permit extensive copy-
ing of a created facts work. This could cover the activities of the
defendants in Southco, Kapes, and perhaps NYMEX.
On the other hand, in many of these opinions with grand pro-
positions about access to factual works-Harper & Row, American Geo-
physical-fair use is not found. This is probably because the fourth fair
use factor-effect on the plaintiffs market287-has been both doctri-
nally and descriptively dominant.28 If that is correct, it suggests that
281 New Era Publ'ns, Int'l v. Carol Publ'g Group, 904 F.2d 152, 157 (2d Cir. 1990);
see also Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237 (1990) ('In general, fair use is more likely
to be found in factual works than in fictional works."); Am. Geophysical Union v.
Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 925 (2d Cir. 1994) (adopting the same reasoning).
282 See 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2000)-. The first factor, "the purpose and character of
the [defendant's] use," see id. at § 107(1), is sufficiently open-ended that we could
include "for compliance with the law" as a characteristic of the circumstances that
should weigh in the defendant's favor. But this effect on the fair use analysis is not
directly related to understanding the expressive works as producing facts.
283 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
284 Id. at 563.
285 Id. (quoting Robert A. Gorman, Fact or Fancy? The Implications for Copyright, 29J.
COPYRIGHT Soc'y U.S.A. 560, 563 (1982)).
286 Id.
287 See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2000).
288 Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978-2005,
156 U. PA. L. Riv. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 55-59), available at http://ssrn.
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wholesale copying as in Maclean Hunter, Delta Dental, Veeck, and BOCA,
or as was sought in Practice Management, would not be tolerated under
fair use.289 In contrast, the implied license doctrine may both cover
the most important created fact cases and prompt a certain amount of
self-selection on the question of copyright incentives.
As the name indicates, implied licenses in copyright may be
inferred from words or conduct. 290 The model code cases seem par-
ticularly apt for this treatment: once the model code is written, the
professional association effectively "hands it over" to the government
knowing that the government will reproduce and distribute the
expression. In the case law, these are paradigmatic indicators of an
implied license,29 1 particularly "the delivery of the copyrighted mate-
rial without warning that its further use would constitute copyright
infringement." 292 Further, it is reasonable to think that the associa-
tion's agreement-or lack of objection-to integration of its model
code into law grants an implied license for derivative works, i.e.,
amendment and modification of the code. 293
com/abstract=998421 (concluding that the fourth factor of § 107 is dispositive in
most cases).
289 The Nimmer treatise reasons that adoption of a private work into law may
enlarge the range of private copying which is protected by the fair use doctrine, but
should not immunize a commercial publisher who wants to compete with the copy-
right owner, since this would "prove destructive of the copyright interest in encourag-
ing creativity in connection with the increasing trend toward state and federal
adoptions of model codes." 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 17, § 5.12[A], at 5-92 to-
93.
290 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 17, § 10.03[A] [7], at 10-49 ("[N]onexclusive
licenses may... be granted orally, or may even be implied from conduct.").
291 See, e.g., Effects Assocs. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 558 (9th Cir. 1990) ("Effects
created a work at defendant's request and handed it over, intending that defendant
copy and distribute it."); see also I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 1996)
("In the case before us, as in Effects, Mr. Shaver created a work at Joint Venture's
request and handed it over, intending Joint Venture to copy and distribute it for the
Airport Project.").
292 Effects, 908 F.2d at 559 n.6. When an association has "encourage [d], through a
licensing program, public authorities such as states to adopt" its model code, Bldg.
Officials & Code Adm'rs v. Code Tech., Inc., 628 F.2d 730, 732 (1st Cir. 1980), the
only alternative to the association anticipating the widespread reproduction of the
adopted law would be the unsavory scenario in which the association would plan to
charge monopoly rents after state adoption, see id. at 732-35. In other words, the
state adoption was like the state awarding a supply contract, except that the citizens,
instead of the state coffers, pay directly for the state's supply of "law."
293 Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 303 (7th Cir. 1983) (indicating that a




A tantalizingly similar case where implied license through govern-
ment use might have been inferred is the 2000 SmithKline Beecham v.
Watson Pharmaceuticals294 case in which SmithKline sued a generic
drug manufacturer for copying SmithKline's copyrighted labels and
user guides, despite the generic drug manufacturer being required to
copy the materials by the Food & Drug Administration. 295 Although
the defendant raised the issue of implied license, the court decided
that the Hatch-Waxman Act directly obviated the copyright claim with-
out need to pass through implied license or fair use analyses. 296 Not
satisfied with its strict legal analysis-and in keeping with the discus-
sion here-the court engaged in a substantial analysis and concluded
that SmithKline did not need copyright incentive for the preparation
of the labels, user's guide, etc. 2 97
Such an implied license obviously seems to cover government
and government-authorized publishers-and it is not difficult to
extend it to other publishers based on a general understanding that
"law" may be freely copied. 29 8 The implied license argument reasona-
bly extends to situations like NYMEX (and SmithKline) where both the
expression and its publication were legally required to engage in an
otherwise lucrative business.299 (In all these cases, for sure, there are
counterarguments.) But the implied license argument seems to have
little traction with cases like Maclean Hunter, Kapes, and Southco--in
which the putative copyright holder did no single act to "hand over"
294 211 F.3d 21 (2d Cir. 2000).
295 Id. at 23. Although there was some back and forth between Watson and the
FDA, "the FDA 'determined that Watson had to copy verbatim substantially all of the
text used in the SmithKline user's guide.'" Id. at 24 (quoting SmithKline Beecham
Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., No. 99 Civ. 9214, 1999 WL
1243894, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 1999)).
296 SmithKline, 211 F.3d at 25 ("The Hatch-Waxman amendments to the FFDCA
not only permit but require producers of generic drugs to use the same labeling as
was approved for, and is used in, the sale of the pioneer drug .... [T]he FDA's
requirement that Watson use much of SmithKline's label precludes a copyright
infringement action .... [W]e need not address either the fair use or implied license
defenses.").
297 Id. at 28-29.
298 On the theory that "there is ample support for the proposition that implied
license scope in general is determined by considering the reasonable expectations of
the parties in view of all of the circumstances, including the parties' conduct." Mark
D. Janis, A Tale of the Apocryphal Axe: Repair, Reconstruction, and the Implied License in
Intellectual Property Law, 58 MD. L. REv. 423, 502 (1999).
299 Although it is fair to ask what would happen if a professional association then
tried to withdraw its implied license. SeeJacob Maxwell, Inc. v. Veeck, 110 F.3d 749,
753 (lth Cir. 1997) (withdrawing an implied license after several months' use of a
song).
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its copyrighted work. To extend the doctrine to those situations
would really involve either some kind of laches or acquiescence argu-
ment (more familiar to trademark law) or a kind of the-value-is-the-
public's-investment argument that has surfaced in scholarship, 30 0 but
has not been well formulated in jurisprudence. 30 1
2. Recalibrating the Merger Doctrine for Created Fact Works
The merger doctrine responds to a fundamental concern for
property theory, a concern identified initially by (and, now, with)
John Locke. In Locke's philosophy, one condition for the acquisition
of private property is that after particular property rights have been
granted to one person, there must still be "enough, and as good" to
be propertized by others.3 0 2 This "enough and as good" proviso ame-
liorates tension between Locke's propositions that each person "plots
a course for his own preservation," while still being "under a natural
obligation to ensure that this conduces to the preservation of all."
°30 3
Across the spectrum of modern political philosophy, there is wide-
spread recognition that any adequate theory of property-or just dis-
300 SeeJessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising Age,
108 YALE L.J. 1717, 1730 (1999) (arguing that advertisers and consumers engage in an
"active collaboration" to increase the value of certain trade symbols). One might also
interpret Rochelle Dreyfuss' argument about expressive genericity along these lines.
See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi
Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 407 (1990) (suggesting that when consumers
increase the value of a trademark by finding a use for the trademark other than for
signaling, the consumers, and not trademark owners, should reap any economic
benefit).
301 One of the best-known efforts might be Judge Boudin's concurrence in Lotus
Development Corp. v. Borland International, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 821 (1st Cir. 1995)
(Boudin, J., concurring) ("But if a better spreadsheet comes along, it is hard to see
why customers who have learned the Lotus menu and devised macros for it should
remain captives of Lotus because of an investment in learning made by the users and
not by Lotus."), afJ'd by an equally divided court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996).
302 See JOHN LocKE, Second Treatise of Government, in Two TREATISES OF GOVERN-
MENT 265, 291 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690). Locke estab-
lishes this condition in describing how people convert pre-society land (and
immovables) into private property. Id. at 287-91; see also C.B. MACPHERSON, THE
POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM 201 (1962) (arguing that Locke's
"enough and as good" limit is justified by the fact that "each man has a right to his
preservation and hence to appropriating the necessities of his life"); GERAINT PARRY,
JOHN LOCKE 64-73, 153-60 (1978) (analyzing Locke's conception of property).
303 JAMES TULLY, A DISCOURSE ON PROPERTY 47 (1980); see also RUTH W. GRANT,




tribution of goods-will contain some version of the requirement that
"enough and as good" be left for others. 30 4
Needless to say, there are questions about how the "enough and
as good" condition applies or does not apply to modern society. What
is clear is that (a) the condition is unworkable if applied too strin-
gently (for example, if highly personal judgments drive the proviso,
then as soon as a particularly attractive meadow or beach is proper-
tized, then "enough and as good" will not remain) and (b) the condi-
tion does little for social justice if "as good" is interpreted too loosely.
Obviously, this parallels our problem with application of the
merger doctrine to ideas. Pick the specific idea "sitting" immediately
on top of the expression and there arguably is always merger, i.e.,
recognizing the copyright would create an "enough and as good"
problem in access to that specific idea. The merger doctrine then
becomes useless. On the other hand, consistently picking an
extremely abstract idea means that there will never be merger and the
doctrine will do nothing to ensure that "enough and as good" remains
in the public domain for others. 3 15
As I said earlier, with things that strike us as "facts," the ability to
slide up and down the scale of abstractness disappears; there is a pre-
cise fact that we want to be available for everyone to use.30 6 Access to
304 Robert Nozick interprets the "enough and as good requirement" as a principle
meant "to ensure that the situation of others is not worsened" by the appropriation of
property from the commons. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 175
(1974). Peter Singer sees the "enough and as good" proviso playing a key role in the
just distribution of the world's natural resources. See PETER SINGER, ONE WORLD
27-30 (2d ed. 2002); see also MICHAEL OTSUKA, LIBERTARIANISM WITHOUT INEQUALITY
22-29 (2003) (endorsing the "enough and as good" principle); David Schmidtz, The
Institution of Property, 11 SoC. PHIL. & POL'V 42, 44-50 (Summer 1994). Many believe
that Locke's proviso, stricto senso, is a sufficient condition, while a more general, harm-
based version of the proviso is a necessary condition. SeeJeremy Waldron, Enough and
as Good Left for Others, 29 PHIL. Q. 319, 320 (1979); Clark Wolf, Contemporary Property
Rights, Lockean Provisos, and the Interests of Future Generations, 104 ETHICS 791, 795-99
(1995). Nozick's reinterpretation can be taken this way. I think that I have fortu-
nately dodged the bullet on this point in prior writings. SeeJustin Hughes, The Philos-
ophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 297-98 (1988) [hereinafter Hughes,
Philosophy]; Hughes, supra note 250, at 966-67.
305 This assumes that broadly permitted propertization of ideas would produce an
"enough and as good" problem. See Hughes, Philosophy, supra note 304, at 314
("Stated simply, some ideas and facts cannot be removed from the common because
there would not be the slightest chance of there being 'enough and as good' after-
wards."). Even recognizing that patent law permits propertization of ideas, there are
good reasons to think that copyright-a system with a very low threshold for the
receipt of exclusive rights and no ex ante examination before creation of the rights-
is a different issue.
306 See supra Part I.C.
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such facts seems necessary for there to be "enough and as good" after
a copyright is recognized. Yet assuming that some economic incentive
was needed for creation of the expressions (which created the facts),
if the merger doctrine strips away the copyright protection, we will
destroy the incentive for the creation of the next iteration of the Red
Book or the CDN Coin Dealer-the very thing that brought the facts into
existence.
The resolution of this problem lies in understanding the tempo-
ral difference. The merger doctrine comes into play ex post facto
when recognizing property rights stemming from some existing work
would make ideas and/or facts unavailable to the broader society. 30 7
In contrast, the incentive rationale of copyright comes into play ex
ante when failure to recognize (or make a commitment to recognize)
property rights stemming from some yet to exist work would make
expressions unavailable to the broader society. 308 The two can be rec-
onciled with a simple presumption: facts and expressions of fact
should not be found to have merged if ex ante knowledge of the
merger doctrine applying to the expression would have prevented crea-
tion of the facts at issue. In other words, we must ask two questions.
First, is the project of bringing the expression into existence also a
project that brings the fact into existence? Second, does this project of
bringing the expression into existence need the incentive provided by
the copyright system? If the answer to these two questions is "yes,"
then in the absence of copyright incentives there will be neither
expressions nor facts to have "merged." The question is how we might
recalibrate the merger doctrine to deal with-and not completely
eliminate copyright in-situations where the incentive of copyright is
needed to generate the facts. There may be profitable insights from
comparing merger doctrine with the "essential facilities" doctrine in
antitrust law.
307 John G. Danielson, Inc. v. Winchester-Conant Props., Inc., 322 F.3d 26, 43 (1st
Cir. 2003) ("The [merger] doctrine aims to prevent the monopolization of facts or
ideas that are present in nature; where ownership of the expression would remove
such facts or ideas from the public domain, the doctrine disallows copyright.").
308 See, e.g., Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)
("The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an 'author's'
creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity
for the general public good.").
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Although often used by the courts,30 9 the essential facilities doc-
trine is much maligned in antitrust scholarship; 31 0 its status has been
further complicated by the Supreme Court's 2004 refusal to either
embrace or kill the doctrine." '' In that context, I propose the essen-
tial facilities doctrine only as a lens through which we might rethink
the merger doctrine as a kind of "essential expression doctrine."
While there are arguably a couple of American cases applying the
essential facilities doctrine to information works broadly under-
stood,3 12 neither the similarity between the merger and essential facili-
309 The doctrine was first applied to a railway bridge over the Mississippi, access to
which was needed by the plaintiffs in order to compete with the defendant in the
provision of rail services in the St. Louis area. See United States v. Terminal R.R.
Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383, 394-413 (1912). Note, however, that Areeda and Hovenkamp
point out that the Court did not actually use the phrase "essential facility" and that
the case holding could arise from more traditional combination grounds. See 3A
PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw, I 772bl, at 176-78 (2d
ed. 2002). Since then, the doctrine has been applied most cleanly to expensive infra-
structure which is not utilized to one hundred percent capacity by the defendant, i.e.,
electric transmission lines, natural gas pipelines, and sports stadiums. See Otter Tail
Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 374-79 (1973) (electric transmission lines);
Fishman v. Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 539-40 (7th Cir. 1986) (professional sports arena);
Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992-93 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (professional foot-
ball stadium); Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 438 F.2d
1286, 1302-10 (5th Cir. 1971) (natural gas pipelines).
310 See, e.g., 3A AREEDA & HOVENCAMP, supra note 309, 771b, at 174 (viewing the
doctrine as "inconsistent with antitrust['s] ... goals"); Gordon Downie & Laura Mac-
Gregor, Essential Facilities and Utility Networks, in REGULATION AND MARKETS BEYOND
2000, at 19, 38 (Laura MacGregor et al. eds., 2000) ("The essential facilities doctrine
takes competition law to the very limits of its legitimate scope, and possibly across the
border into regulation."); David Reiffen & Andrew N. Kleit, Terminal Railroad Revis-
ited: Foreclosure of an Essential Facility or Simple Horizontal Monopoly?, 33J.L. & ECON. 419,
420-21 (1990) ("[E]conomic theory suggest[s] that there is no need for an essential
facilities doctrine ....").
311 In Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398 (2004), the Court held that its judgment "would be unchanged even if we consid-
ered to be established law the 'essential facilities' doctrine crafted by some lower
courts .... We have never recognized such a doctrine and we find no need either to
recognize it or to repudiate it here." Id. at 410-11 (citations omitted). Not surpris-
ingly, the Court also stated that any "essential facilities" claim could not be distinct
from a section 2 Sherman Act claim. Id. at 411 ("To the extent respondent's 'essen-
tial facilities' argument is distinct from its general § 2 argument, we reject it."); see also
Michael A. Carrier, Of Trinko, Tea Leaves, and Intellectual Property, 31 J. CORP. L. 357,
361 (2006) (discussing the Supreme Court's refusal to recognize the essential facili-
ties doctrine as established law).
312 One case, Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir.
1991), arguably comes close because the computerized reservation systems at issue-
United's "Apollo" and American's "SABRE" systems-were, in part, elaborate, con-
stantly updated databases. Id. at 538. Those databases, however, probably fell outside
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ties doctrine 3 13 nor application of the essential facilities doctrine to
copyrighted works has been explored extensively in American legal
literature.3 14
The essential facilities cases involving unilateral action (section 2
of the Sherman Act 3 15) typically involve a vertically-integrated defen-
dant who controls an input for some downstream market in which the
defendant has or could have monopoly power.3 16 As formulated in
the Seventh Circuit's 1983 opinion in MCI Communications Corp. v.
AT&T,3 17 successful assertion of the essential facilities doctrine
requires four elements:
1. That the defendant controls an upstream facility or resource that
is essential to competition in the market where the defendant has
(or could have) monopoly power;
post-Feist American copyright law. Id. at 542-46; see also Intergraph Corp. v. Intel
Corp., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1278 (N.D. Ala. 1998) (finding that "[r]easonable and
timely access to critical business information .. .is an essential facility"), vacated, 195
F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999). In the United Kingdom, the case of Radio Telefis Eireann
(RTE) & Independent Television Publications Ltd (ITP) v. Commission of the European Com-
munities (Magill), Joined Cases C-241/91 P & C-242/91 P, 1995 E.C.R. 1-743, con-
cerned an information product. Id. at 1-811. Commonly called the Magill case, the
dispute concerned the provision of television programming information by the BBC,
RTE, and ITP networks to daily newspapers under a license arrangement and their
subsequent refusal to provide the information to Magill, a small independent pub-
lisher, who wanted to publish a comprehensive weekly television guide. Id. at 1-812.
The court reasoned that the television companies were the only source of this infor-
mation, and their refusal to provide it prevented the introduction of a new product
that would be advantageous to consumers. Id. at 1-824; see also Downie & MacGregor,
supra note 310, at 25 (discussing Magill).
313 See, e.g., Dana R. Wagner, The Keepers of the Gates: Intellectual Property, Antitrust,
and Regulatory Implications of Systems Technology, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1073, 1122-24 (2000)
(identifying the two doctrines as two distinct "possible doctrinal foundations" for cre-
ating liability for systems technology industries that fail to license or open their tech-
nology, but not identifying the similarity/sameness of the two doctrines).
314 Exceptions are Carrier, supra note 311, at 361; Michael A. Carrier, Refusals to
License Intellectual Property After Trinko, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 1191, 1207-08 (2006);
David McGowan, Regulating Competition in the Information Age: Computer Software as an
Essential Facility Under the Sherman Act, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 771, 841-49
(1996) (discussing the essential facilities doctrine in the context of network effects);
Peter S. Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1329,
1366-67 (1987) (applying an essential facilities approach to compulsory licensing for
innovative operating system features that become widely established); Melanie J.
Reichenberger, Note, The Role of Compulsory Licensing in Unilateral Refusals to Deal. Have
the United States and European Approaches Grown Further Apart After IMS?, 31 J. CORP. L.
549, 558-65 (2006).
315 15 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 1997 & Supp. 2007).
316 3A AREEDA & HOVENCAMP, supra note 309, 771a, at 169-71.
317 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983).
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2. That competitor(s) cannot practically or reasonably replicate the
facility;
3. That the defendant denies use of the facility to the competitor(s);
and
4. That granting access is feasible [and economically rational but for
maintenance of the monopoly] because granting access would not
disrupt the monopolist's own use of the facility.318
Each of these requirements can have some resonance for copy-
right cases. For example, a requirement differentiating between
upstream and downstream markets mirrors, in some respects, a
strongly intuitive concern in fair use doctrine-the distinction
between primary and ancillary markets: copyright scholars have
focused much of their turn-of-the-century angst on the issue of how
derivative works should be freed (or freer) of the upstream works
from which they are derived. 31 9
But it is the second and fourth criteria of the essential facilities
doctrine that should interest us with "created fact" works. The second
criterion in the essential facility checklist is that "the competitors of
the monopolist are unable to duplicate the facility."3 20 As the Areeda
treatise points out, in the context of antitrust law,
[T]he essential facility claim is about the duty to deal of a monopo-
list who is able to supply an input for itself in a fashion that is so
superior to anything else available that others cannot succeed
unless they can access this firm's input as well. For this reason a
318 Id. at 1132-33. The Ninth Circuit embraced the four elements. Ferguson v.
Greater Pocatello Chamber of Commerce, 848 F.2d 976, 983 (9th Cir. 1988) ("[T]he
plaintiffs must establish (1) that the defendant is a monopolist in control of the essen-
tial facility, (2) that competitors of the monopolist are unable to duplicate the facility,
(3) that the monopolist has refused to provide the competitors access to the facility,
and (4) that it is feasible for the monopolist to do so."); accord City of Malden v.
Union Elec. Co., 887 F.2d 157, 160 (8th Cir. 1989) (listing the same factors); see also
Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 542-45 (9th Cir. 1991)
(discussing criteria for liability under "essential facilities" doctrine); Aspen Highlands
Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d 1509, 1520-21 (10th Cir. 1984), affd, 472
U.S. 585, 611 (1985) (noting that affirmance on traditional monopolization theory
made it "unnecessary" to analyze the essential facilities holding of the appellate
court).
319 See, e.g., Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and the Public Good Economics: A Misunder-
stood Relation, 155 U. PA. L. Rrv. 635, 659 (2007) ("The absence of any independent
copyright protection in derivative works leaves initial authors free to appropriate
them without the follow-on authors' consent .. .
320 Ferguson, 848 F.2d at 983.
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strict concept of objectively measured "essentiality" is critical to any
rational essential facility doctrine .... 321
When expressions have taken on the glow of institutional facts
because of integration into binding law, the case of essentiality seems
straightforward. The Medicare and Medicaid programs would not
permit a physician to seek reimbursement with any other procedure
designations; a person whose car is totaled must use the Red Book
number in seeking an insurance recovery. Although quite critical of
the essential facilities doctrine in antitrust law, even Professor Areeda
recognized that "the strongest claims of essentiality" include resources
"whose duplication is forbidden by law."3 2 2 That is exactly the situa-
tion in the BOCA, Veeck, Maclean Hunter, and Practice Management
cases.
For expressions which have taken on the glow of social facts as a
matter of convention-Kapes and Southco--the case for essentiality is
substantial, but not as strong. Still, if we have concluded that an
author's creations have become social facts or institutional facts in the
Searlean sense, then generally speaking the expression of those social
facts will be necessary, unique, and irreplaceable as to a range of activ-
ities distinct from the author's primary market. "Factness" is essential-
ity in a society that places the emphasis on public discourse that ours
does.
But it is the fourth requirement of the essential facilities doctrine
which provides the most interesting payoff in how to apply the merger
doctrine to created fact works. The fourth requirement of the essen-
tial facilities doctrine is "the feasibility of providing the facility" 323 to
others without undermining the defendant's own commercial activi-
ties. At first blush, it appears that this fourth element is automatically
satisfied with intellectual property: the public goods nature of infor-
mation works means that the copyright owner will always be able to
"provide" the information facility while continuing to use the expres-
sion herself.
321 3A AREEDA & HOVENCAMP, supra note 309, 771a, at 171; see also Phillip
Areeda, The "Essential Facilities" Doctrine: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58
ANTITRUST L.J. 841; 847-53 (1989) (discussing the implications of the legality of
monopoly pricing on the essential facilities doctrine).
322 3A AREEDA & HOVENCAMP, supra note 309, 773a, at 196. But the Areeda
treatise also notes that "when duplication is prohibited by law, forced sharing may be
as well," citing patent law. Id. at 196 n.2. While the federal government's adoption of
the CPT codes for Medicaid payments did not "forbid" the development of alternative
codes, it does make such development pointless or, more strongly, it makes it impossi-
ble to develop a competitor facility.
323 See MCI, 708 F.2d at 1081, 1133.
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But the situation is more complicated if we think, again, about ex
ante and ex post facto perspectives. If the fourth requirement is that
the property owner must be able to continue to enjoy use of the facil-
ity, then we should ask: will the defendant, over the long term, be able to
continue to use the created fact work for its own commercial activities? And
this is the key difference of eliminating exclusive rights in traditional
merger analysis and what an essential facilities analysis would produce:
a kind of compulsory license.
We have posited that in some situations ex ante knowledge of the
merger doctrine applying to the expression of facts would have pre-
vented creation of the facts at issue. In other words, if the publishers
of the Red Book or the Coin Dealer Newsletter knew, in advance, that the
merger doctrine would allow people to freely copy their publications,
they "might direct their energies elsewhere, depriving the public of
their creations"324 -and, thereby, deprive the public of the (created)
facts. In other words, the traditional merger doctrine might eliminate
the next iteration of the "facility"-both for the producer of the work
and for those who benefited (temporarily) from the merger doctrine.
In antitrust law the essential facilities doctrine certainly does not
require the defendant to give away access to the facility so as to cause
decline, waste, or destruction of the facility.325 So, where we determine
that the incentive structure of copyright is genuinely needed to gener-
ate the (created) facts, then our modified merger doctrine should
require the producer of the created fact work to license the work on
reasonable, nondiscriminatory, and still profitable terms.
Since merger is ajudge-created doctrine, there is no ban to graft-
ing onto it compelled licensing in these rare situations of created fact
works for which the economic incentive of copyright has been judged
necessary for creation of the work. This comports with a small, but
growing body of intellectual property case law including the Ninth
Circuit's 1988 Abend v. MCA, Inc. decision,3 26 the Supreme Court's
324 CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 66 (2d
Cir. 1994).
325 Cf Areeda, supra note 321, at 850, where Areeda points out that in the context
of MCI, no court would order interconnection if it would harm the incumbent's facili-
ties. Some uses might do that to a work.
326 863 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1988). The compulsory license nature of the court's
decision is made clear by the remand instructions that, in calculating the plaintiff's
portion of the defendant's profits, "the district court must recognize" that "the tre-
mendous success" of the film was "attributable in significant measure to . . .Grace
Kelly and James Stewart-and the brilliant directing of Alfred Hitchcock." Id. at
1478. The court was clearly of the mind that the plaintiff would take far less than one
hundred percent of the studio's profit from the film. Id. at 1480.
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1995 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. decision, 327 and the Court's
recent 2006 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. decision, 328 cases that, as
many commentators have noted, constitute the germ of a case-by-case,
judicially imposed compulsory licensing system.3 29
While a situation like Abend leaves the damage level to the judge's
intuitions, decisions concerning the created fact works discussed
above need not be so ad hoc. Created fact works are typically iterated
works-works that are continually updated and for which any one edi-
tion has a limited shelf life of value. The Red Book and Coin Dealer
Newsletter have extremely short shelf lives; the CPT, the ADA Nomen-
clature, and the model legal codes are more stable, but a party using
the code is ill advised not to have a complete, up-to-date set. Thus,
when a judge determines that "essential expression" should be made
available to third parties, a price can be set that ensures that the copy-
right owner continues to keep the information facility in "good
repair," so to speak-not much differently than the owner of a bridge
or power lines deserves adequate returns under the essential facilities
doctrine to maintain the physical facilities.
In the occasional circumstances when this proposal will come
into play, it is still subject to the same criticism that the Court recently
leveled against any court-enforced sharing: it forces courts to identify
the "proper price ... and other terms of dealing-a role for which
they are ill-suited. ' 330 If there is no visible market failure in, say, the
used car or collector coin markets, why attempt this market interven-
327 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994) ("[Tlhe goals of the copyright law .. . are not
always best served by automatically granting injunctive relief when [defendants] are
found to have gone beyond the bounds of fair use.").
328 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1838-41 (2006) (concluding that injunctive relief in patent law
is not automatic, but follows equitable consideration).
329 Wendy J. Gordon, Assertive Modesty: An Economics of Intangibles, 94 COLUM. L.
REv. 2579, 2588 n.41 (1994) (noting that "[t]odayjudges are more open to exploring
liability-rule avenues in copyright litigation" (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578 n.10));
Alice Haemmerli, Take It, It's Mine: Illicit Transfers of Copyright by Operation of Law, 63
WASH. & LEE L. Rv. 1011, 1020 (2006) ("In these cases, one could say that the court's
refusal to grant injunctive relief for copyright infringement effectively results in a
compulsory license in favor of the defendant."); Karjala, supra note 5, at 462 n.88 ("If
fair use were a reliable form of compulsory license, it could be an important counter-
weight to a copyright in functional works. Its use in this fashion, however, has little
foundation other than a footnote in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell.");
TimothyJ. McClimon, Denial of Preliminay Injunction in Copyright Infringement Cases: An
Emerging Judicially Crafted Compulsory License, 10 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 277, 303
(1986) ("This type of implicit compulsory license is emerging in the courts on an
increasing basis ....").
330 See Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398, 408 (2004) ("Enforced sharing also requires antitrust courts to act as central
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tion? The answer comes in more or less summarizing the project
here: (a) we generally make copyright available for these sorts of
expressive works to avoid one sort of market failure; and (b) we have
identified one limited set of situations (Maclean Hunter-like cases)
where the intervention of copyright does seem needed to ensure that
the market is supplied with the expression and the facts; (c) we have
strong non-market reasons-related to democratic self-governance-
for wanting to make "facts" available to all; yet (d) application of our
usual doctrinal tool-merger-will negate (b) and, thereby, kill off
the facts. The most reasonable course in these rare circumstances is
to "dial back," not turn off, the incentive of copyright.
CONCLUSION
In the thirteenth century, St. Bonaventure called the scribes of
his time "compilers and weavers of approved opinions,"33 1 an apt
description for the activities-and resulting works-of companies like
Maclean Hunter and nonprofit associations like the AMA, ADA,
BOCA, and SBCCI. Sometimes privately generated opinions become
so widely "approved" that they become necessary for subsequent
expressive and nonexpressive activities. Based on such widespread-
often legally mandated-use, these "opinions" become woven into the
social fabric as facts, as or more significant to our lives than facts of
nature. When an author's intentional act of creating the expression
produces the social fact, I call the results "created facts."
The Feist decision's definition of "facts" and its understanding of
their unprotected nature fails to capture how created facts arise in our
social reality. Copyrighted works can generate social facts via many
avenues: the ones described in this Article have been evaluations, des-
ignations, and model provisions that become essential for others to
use in subsequent expressive and nonexpressive activities. As our
economy produces more and more "information products," valuable
nonfictional databases filled with evaluations,judgments, and designa-
tions will proliferate. Similarly, government reliance on privately cre-
ated model codes "reflects a governmental off-balance sheet financing
strategy" 33 2 and is not going to abate at a time when the public fisc is
strained (if there ever was a time when it was not).
Skillful jurists like Judges Leval and Newman deftly avoided the
"facts" issue in the years immediately following Feist, but courts are
planners, identifying the proper price, quantity, and other terms of dealing-a role
for which they are ill-suited.").
331 DICTIONARY OF THE MIDDLE AGES 56 (Joseph R. Strayer ed., 1 th ed. 1988).
332 Cunningham, supra note 4, at 330.
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now starting to recognize that expressions created by identifiable indi-
viduals produce social facts. The problem is that if we admit that
these works generate "facts," the merger doctrine seems to lead-
almost inextricably-to elimination of the copyright in the works
involved.
This Article suggests that the merger doctrine should be applied
differently in created fact situations depending on whether the copy-
right incentive was truly needed for production of the created facts
work. Where no copyright incentive is needed, the merger doctrine
can be applied traditionally-as in situations like Southco--because
those lists or designations would be created even if the creator knew
that the results would not be protectable under copyright. But the
merger doctrine should not apply to eliminate copyright when the ex
ante elimination of copyright's incentive for yet-to-be-created expres-
sions offact would prevent the social facts themselves from ever coming
into existence. Maclean Hunter and Kapes probably fit this description.
Instead, in such circumstances-as infrequent as they may be-the
merger doctrine should produce a compulsory license/sharing result,
as the essential facilities doctrine does. Instead of doctrine-distorting
machinations to withhold application of the merger doctrine, we
should apply it in a sensible way that does not destroy the future flow
of both expressions of facts and the facts themselves.
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